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Preface 
Since 1883, when the modern navy of the United States was first be-
gun, our navy has grwon steadily from. a point where we were quite satisfied 
with a very small navy, to the pinnacle it has now reached, a navy second to 
none. It has been said that the size of the navy is dependent upon the 
foreign policy of the government and then account must be taken of our de-
mands for Freedom of the Seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Open Door Policy. 
There is a large group of people in the country, who, for either 
patriotic or personal reasons, desire a very stro~ navy; but there is 
equally as large a group who fail to see the practical sense ot buildi~ bat-
tleships, that cost nearly forty-million dollars and which become obsolete 
and useless attar a few years ot peaceful floating about the seas. This lat-
ter group along with those who have grown weary of useless warfare and who 
have been appalled by the wicked sacrifice of life and wealth, have sought a 
way tor diminishing the size of our navy, rather than tor its expansion. 
Both groups have tried to direct public opinion, since they realize it is 
public sentiment that determines the policies ot the country. 
The purpose of this paper is to record the results of an investigati 
ot the development of the naval policy of the United States, 1919-1931, ex-
plaining the basis upon which it rests, and showing how it has been influ-
enced by the two opposing forces in the country--the one demanding a continu-
ous increase of the navy and the other attempting to limit it. 
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CHAPl'ER I 
'mE DEVELOPMENI' OF TEE NAVAL POLICY 
OF THE ONI'rED STATES TO 1921 
2 
Background .2!, ..2.'!E Naval Policy 
In general, the naval policy ot the United States in the period 1919-
19.32 was the maintaining ot a naval establishment equal to that ot Great 
Britain and larger by 5/.3 than that ot J"apan. To understand the naval policy 
ot the United States, it is necessary, tirst, to summarize the tacts and 
events which brought about our naval expansion program. and, second, to anal 
the motives behind this building plan. It was in 1916 that the United States 
decidedly became sea-minded. For halt a century the American people had 
thought very little about the sea, tor there were easier ways ot earning a 
living in this country than by the hard, salt-denying labor ot the sea. The 
resources ot our country made our people much more interested in agriculture 
and in internal illlprovements. Then our country became highly industrialized 
tactories were built at strategic sites and great cities came into baing. 
With startling suddenness, our people became imperialistic; prestige demanded 
that we become a world power with outlying possessions ot our own. Probably 
the outstanding aspect ot this increased nationalism was a desire tor power 
on the ocean. 
Modern navaliam dates trom about 1880 although its seeds had been 
sown some twenty years ea:dier when the tirst experiments with iron side armor 
and turret mountings, as well as with steam propulsion had introduced the 
machine age into naval warfare. To survey the historical development ot this 
modern .American Navy, it will be necessary to study the expenditures tor the 
navy. 
......---
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Year Amount Spent on Navy Year Amount Spent on Navy-1 
1880 $ 13,536,985 1915 $141,835,654 
1890 22,006,206 1916 155,029,426 
1900 55,953,078 1917 257,166,437 
1901 60,506,978 1918 1,368,642, 794 
1902 67,803,128 1919 2,009,272,389 
1903 82,618,034 1920 629,893,116 
1904 102,956,102 1921 647,870,645 
1905 117,550,308 1922 458,794,813 
1906 110,474,264 1923 322,532,909 
1907 97,128,469 1924 324,129,998 
1908 118,237,097 1925 32h ,365,467 
1909 115,546,011 192h 311,611,694 
1919 123,173,717 1927 322,620,723 
1911 119,937,644 1928 337,608,086 
1912 135,591,956 1929 364,806,678 
1913 133,2h2,862 1930 374,052,691 
1914 139,682,1.86 
Certain facts are discernible. In 1880 the amount spent on the navy 
was at a low point, but by 1890, we f'ind an extraordinary rise in expenditure, 
while the 1900 figure more than doubled the 1890 amount. Since that time it 
has risen almost steadily until it reached its abnormal peak in the World War 
years. 
It was in the administration of President .Arthur that the new navy--
a very modest one--was begun. There was no serious thought of disputing the 
"dominion of the sea" with England's great fleet and our naval policy at the 
time was decidedly not naval expansion. As late as 1894, we were content to 
stand about sixth on the list of naval powers. The idea of "parity" with the 
large British fleet would hardly have been advanced by the most ambitious 
naval expansionist. Yet only ten years later a great change had taken place. 
By 1904, we had built a fleet that was the second largest in the world, sur-
passed only by that of Great Britain and we had more than doubled the amount 
~eport of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30, 1930, 498-501. 
4 
spent on our navy. 
Just what events had occurred that made naval defense such an active 
issue? First, there was the Samoan affair that stirred the national honor. 
In March 1889, it was rumored that a German ship had sunk an American vessel. 
A wave of excitement swept over the country 
says the historian, Harry Thur-ston Peck. 
In San Francisco, great crowds filled the streets and massed themselves 
about the newspaper offices, awaiting the posting of further bulletins. 
The tone of the press was one of intense hostility to Germany. The 
govermnent at Washington began preparing for any emergency that might 
arise. Al~ the vessels of the Pacific squadron were notified to be in 
readiness. 
At last the real news came. The rumor had been false--a frightful hurricane 
had wrecked the ships--yet, the .Americans began to realize that a navy was 
necessary. Second, there was the Venezuelan affair with Great Britain, that 
brought home clearly the fact that if our govermnent was to assert authority 
that implied war, then provision would have to be made for fighting the war. 
Even though it was discovered that Great Britain was mainly right in her 
demands on Venezuela, this did not alter the psychological force behind naval 
expansion. 
Third, there was the victorious war with Spain which generated great 
enthusiasm for the navy. Our navy had covered itself with glory in the war 
and the Americans were very proud of it. It was not difficult to prove to 
the people and Congress that our naval power must be expanded, since there 
were also the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico to protect. We realized 
2Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic, Dodd Mead and 
Company, New York, 1920, 186. 
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that we were becoming an important world power. 
Theodore Roosevelt was greatly responsible for the big-navy idea. In 
hiS address before the Naval War College in ~une 1897, he paid tribute to 
peace at the same time that he advocated a big navy: 
In all our history there has never been a time when preparedness for 
war was any menace to peace. On the contrary, again and again, we have 
owed peace to the fact that we were prepared for war •••.• Arbitration is 
an excellent thing •••• but ultimately those who wish to see this country 
at peace with foreign nations will be wise if they place reliance upon 
a first class fleet or first class battle-ships, rather than on any arbi-
tration treaty whiCh the wit of man can devise. A really great people, 
proud and h~h-spirited, would face all the disasters of war rather than 
purchase that base prosperity which is bought at the price of national 
honor ••••• We aSk for a great navy partly because we •••• feel that no 
national life is worth having if the nation is not willing, when the need 
shall arise, to stake everythi~ on the supreme arbitrament or war, and 
to pour out its blood, its treasure, and tears like water rather than to 
submit to the loss of honor and renown.3 
For the fiscal year which closed shortly before President Roosevelt 
was inaugurated, the amount spent on the navy was $60,5o6,978; for the year 
which closed a few months after his departure :trom Washi~ton, the amount 
spent was $115,5.46 ,on. During his terms of office, the outlay almost 
doubled. 
At this time, Great Britain and Germany entered into a naval race 
that ended in the ruin of Germany. Great Britain alarmed by the growth of 
the German navy brof€ht out in 19o6 "H.M.S. Dreadnaught", the first all big-
gun battleship, planned to make obsolete at a stroke the whole German navy.4 
The design succeeded; but un:f'ortunatel.y, it also made obsolete the British 
3~oseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt~!!!!.!.!!!!, Scribner's 
Sons, 1920, Vol. I, 74-75· 
4
s. B. Fay, ~Origins 2!..!!!! World War, Vol. I, 234. 
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naVY' and every other navy as well. The great battleship fleet built up dur-
1ng the Roosevelt administration was now only a second string defense. The 
superiority of the British fleet bad been removed; all the nations could staxt 
at an equal' point in the new race for dread-na~t tonnage, which bad become 
the only thing that counted. The Germans and British pltmged ahead, but the 
Americans held back, our expenditures increasing steadily though not spectactr 
larly. By 1914, at the end of the nax:t ten-year period, the British had built 
forty-six dread-naught battleships and cruisers, the Ger.mans had twenty-eight, 
and even Japan had ten. The United States had only twelve. The second power 
standard had been dropped, but still the competitive idea was in the minds of 
the people, and just a few years later we were asserting our right to a navy 
at least equal to that of the strongest power on the seas and greater by one 
third than the next most powerful fleet. 
How had this come about? Once more it seems to have been the outcome 
of historical accident. The outbreak of the war in Europe, added to the e:x-
ci tement of the Vera Cruz landing and the Mexican border trouble had natural~ 
awakened a great interest in the state of our own military machinery. During 
the World War in the neutral years, amazing changes in COliDil.erce and finances 
in the United States had taken place. Large groups and interests turned 
their attention to maritime affairs.5 Decreased production in Europe made 
increased demands on our goods, and our shipping and commercial interests 
made huge dividends. Our people became highly nationalistic and our navy 
plans were transformed. President Wilson in his annual message of December 
1914 declared "A powerful navy we have always regarded as our proper and 
5Benjamin H. Williams, Economic Foreign Policy 2! ~United States, 
McGraw Hill Book Co., New York and London, 1929. 
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and natura1 means of defense.n6 
The European War promised to give practically for the first time, a 
sort of laboratory trial of the effectiveness of the machine-age navy. For a 
time, the belief had gained ground that the submarine had greatly reduced the 
importance of the big ship, but, at Jut1and in May, 1916, the success of the 
heavily ar.mored vessel with large-caliberd guns had disposed naval men to re-
turn to their faith in the powerful capital ship. It was decided that the 
all-big-gun ship was the best. 7 .After the submarine sinking of the Lusitania 
the great campaign of naval building began. 
The naval bill of 1915 carried increased appropriations but that was 
only a beginning. 8 The Republicans were not satisfied and referred to the 
weak-kneed attitude of the Wilson administration on defense. They asked tor 
the old second power standard, which seemed a simple demand, hallowed by 
precedent. By the fall of 1915, the secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, 
asked the Genera1 Board to prepare a five year program that would make our 
navy second to Great Britain's. This he felt would be the correct answer to 
the critics who said the Wilson administration was neglecting national detensac 
6Public Papers 2! Woodrow Wilson .rn, 226, edited by R. s. Baker, 
Harper and Bros., New York and London, 1925. 
7Report 2!_ the Secretary 2! the~ tor 1920, 7• 
8sena.te Docunent No. 428, 6.6th Co~ress Jrd Session, Vol. 14. "Navy 
Yearbook" 1920-21, 420. 
~ew ~Times, November 10, 1915. 
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ThiS program was to make history. President Wilson was in :favor of' it, and 
when Congress reopened in December 1915, the diplomatic tension and the patri 
otic f'erver had become so great that he devoted his entire message to the one 
subject ot national defense. Summarizing he said: 
I have spoken today, gentlemen, upon a single theme, the thorough 
preparation o:r the nation to care :for its own security, and to make sure 
of' entire freedom to play the important role in this hemisphere and in 
the world 'Which we all believe to have been providentially assigned to 
it.lO 
It was the president, again, who gave the next great extension to our 
mounting navalism.. At the beginning o:r 1916 he had gone on a speaking tour 
o:r the United States, speaking on behalt of' preparedness and his own re-elec-
tion. It ended in St. Louis on Feb:ruary third. In an afternoon speech, Mr. 
Wilson had portrayed the horrors o:r the war in Europe but at the coliseum. in 
the evening, his subject was preparedness. At :first, the audience seemed un-
friendly, but as he made his plea stronger and stronger, he carried his 
listeners to emotional heights. Possibly, in response to this emotionalism, 
he, too, was carried away, tor he cried that the American navy "ought in my 
judgment, to be incomparably the most adequate navy in the world. nll Thus 
was the idea of' the United States not simply as the second power of' the Me-
Kinley, Roosevelt days, but as the supreme naval nation de1"ini tely introduced 
into the body of' our naval policy. 
The Naval Act of' 1916 was a milestone in our naval e:x:pansion.12 In 
10Publlc Papers o:r Woodrow Wilson .m., ~· ill·, 423. 
11 ~·, IV, 112-114. 
12 Senate Document~, "Navy Yearbook", 490. 
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its final form the 1916 program enacted by Congress did not authorize a navy 
"incomparably the most adequate in the world", but it did provide for the 
building within three years of 813,000 tons of naval vessels, calling for ten 
battleships with twelve sixteen-inch guns, and si:x: battle cruisers, armed witll 
eight sixteen-inch guns and capable of a thirty-four knot speed. In addition 
the program planned for ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, sixty-seven 
submarines, and same lesser types, the whole estimated to cost from $544,000,-
000 up. Actual. appropriations could be made for one year al.one therefore in 
the first year, it provided for four battleships, four battle cruisers, four 
light cruisers, and a few of the lesser vessels. 
The Act of 1916 would have given the United States a great preponder-
anee in heavy ships. A forecast of the anticipated naval situation of 1923, 
made prior to the Washington Conference by Congressman Britten of the House 
Committee on Naval Affairs, showed that altogether the American fleet would 
have possessed thirty-three capital ships as compared with thirty-five in the 
British navy, but our ships would have been larger and would have had greater 
gun power. This comparison led Hector Bywater, the able British naval. writer 
to observe in 1921: 
On the basis of modern am.ored vessels completed, building, and au-
thorized the British navy has already declined to second rank. And in 
this connection it is important to note that the modern armored vessel--
the capital ship--remains in the deliberate opinion of the British 
Admiralty the unit on which sea power is built up.l3 
The 1916 program was never completed. In a few months we were at war 
with Germany and the 1916 program was east aside as useless. What was 
1~ector Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific, Houghton Mifflin and Co., 
Boston, 1921, lOft. - --
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required to tight the Germans was not battleships or battle cruisers, it was 
merchant ships to carry food and light men-of-war capable of dropping depth 
bombs on submarines. Of the eight leviathans which were to have been com-
menced by J"uly 1917, we actually laid down just one. But the destroyer pro-
gram had been greatly increased. By 1919, we had built five times as many 
destroyers as had been authorized by the 1916 program. Of the ten battleshi 
we had barely got started on two; we laid down only two of the ten light 
cruisers, and of the six majestic battle cruisers we had actually laid down 
not a single oue. 
The naval program anacted in 1916 was spectacular and it set in 
motion programs alld counter programs. It gave rise to suspicions and alarms 
and finally led to a series of remarkable international conferences. Before 
the war, our navy endangered no-one, but by 1919 we had become a part of the 
world system of military rivalry. 
The Motives Behind~ Naval Ex;pansion Program 
So far a summary has been given of the facts and events which brought 
about our naval expansion program. What are the motives behind this building 
plan? 
Our naval policy has its roots deep in our national history. Once 
free of Great Britain, our chief purpose for many years was to keep out of 
European affairs, especially out of the war waging between England and France. 
At the same time, our commercial interests were trying to trade with all the 
European nations, regardless of their state of belligerency. Our naval 
policy evolved fundamentally out of this state of aftirs. We looked upon 
ourselves as neutrals and insisted upon our rights as neutrals. We called 
11 
that "freedom of' the seas". We claimed the right in time of' war, to carry 
everythi~, except military supplies to both belligerents, unless the bellig-
erent port were actively and actually blockaded. For a time, during our 
Civil War, our government abandoned this doctrine am. England became its 
temporary, but lukewarm advocate, abandoning tor the time being her policy 
of' •control of' the Seas•. 
The outbreak of' the world war in 1914 f'ound the two countries f'irmly 
supporting their traditional doctrines. The United States insisted on her 
rights as a neutral, while Great Britain paid very little attention to our 
demands. In carrying out her plan to starve Germany into submission, England 
otten stopped our ships at sea and this interference, justifiable tram the 
British point of' view, crystallized the demand in this country tor a navy 
second to none. 
In an article in the..!!!!! York Times, J"emes T. Shotwell, Professor of' 
History at Columbia University, writes: 
All through .American history there has been one supreme principle of' 
naval rights which has rEmained an ideal unattained, and that is freedom 
of the seas. On the other hand, the British have almost as consistently 
opposed this principle. The reason for the two mtional attitudes lies 
chiefly in the tact that the presumption of' the United States has been 
that in most wars it would be a neutral, therefore it was but natural 
that it should be the champion of' neutral rights against belligerents •••• 
On the other hand, Great Britain involved as it is in the maintenance 
of' a world-wide empire, has been more likely to think in belligerent terns 
and more likely to be drawn into wars arising almost anywhere throughout 
the world.l4 
George Young, adviser on international af'f'airs to the British labor 
party claimed that the two policies--freedom ot the seas and control of' the 
14r.i t erary D:lg est , 100, Feb rua.ry 16, 1929, 9. 
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seas--are merely points of view of the same thing. He explained that England, 
f'ighti:ng for the freedom of the seas refused her by the Papil. Bull dividing 
the seas between Spain and Portugal, acquired command of' the seas and pre-
dieted that the sane outcome was inevitable in the case at America. To gain 
freedom at the seas, America would very likely also gain command of the seas, 
unless something different were definitely planned.l5 
This belief' in our neutral rights and in the freedom of the seas is 
fundamental in our creed and has been a most useful argument for the advocatee 
or large navies. Rear Admiral W. L. Rodgers declared: 
The principal diplomatic service of the American navy will always 
be f'ound in its support of' neutrality and the neutral rights of commerce. 
This support is a fundamental policy which directs the shipbuilding pro-
gram of' the Navy Department. For the nab" must be adequate to guard its 
commerce when other nations are at war.l 
As an outgrowth of' this policy of freedom of the seas, it has natu-
rally developed in our naval policy that our navy should be strong enough to 
protect our commerce. This was strikingly emphasized while debating the 
cruiser bill of 1929 by Senator Borah: 
So Mr. President, •••• we really have in our minds the sole question 
of how we are going to protect our commerce. I do not thillk many think 
of the use at the Navy in any other light ••••• The moving, controlling 
question is how to protect our commerce against the inroads or those who 
may be engaged in war.l7 
Congressman Britten objected strenuously to what he said was British 
regulation of our commerce during the World War. 
15Quincy Wright, editor, Interpretations~ American Foreign Policz, 
The University at Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930, 91 ft. 
16w. L. Rodgers, "The Navy as an Aid in Carrying Out Diplomatic Poli-
cies", United States Naval Proceedings, Vol. 55, 102-3, Feb. 1929. 
17congressional Record, 70, 21S3, J"an. 24, 1929. 
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In order to ship furniture, shoe polish, etc., f'rom my own district 
to Norway in American bottoms from our own ports, I had to go to the 
British embassy here f'or a permit to ship them. The application had to 
indicate the Character of the material, how it was to be packed, the size 
of it, and the cost. That inf'ormation was turned over to the commercial 
office of' Great Britain in London. The permit itself' was issued in London 
Do you think a powerful nation u;pon the seas would countenance such an in-
sult? No; it never would have asked that permission.lS 
It has been argued that our doctrine of neutral rights has very little 
value. It is true that our neutral trade rose to unprecedented heights both 
!before 1812 and 1917, and it is also true that when we began fighting, our 
profits were lost. But even though this is tact, yet our pride prohibits us 
from submitting to interference with our neutral trade on the part of' a bell18 
erent. It is sad that the plans tor abolishing wars has gone awry, tor it is 
only thro~h peace that comm.erce can be really made profitable. 
The :rtmdem.ental 11.otive behind our naval policy is protection. Unques-
tionably, our navy must defend our American heritage--our land where 131,000,-
000 pa:>ple live, our wealth the outgrowth of our enormous resources, our 
social interests and our institutions. We want this protected against foreign 
invasion, but as inexpensively as possible. Fortunately, it is not difficult 
to guard the United States against enemy attack. Our geographic position has 
given us the advantage of' long distances on the east and west between our 
country and foreign nations and an in:vasion of our country along either of' our 
shores is a.lmost unbelievable. There is no reasonable chance that a foreign 
govermnant would be able to take the coast of the United States against the 
defense of' our fleet, With its battleships, cruisers, coast artillery, torpedo 
craft, mines, and aircraft. The only daiJger would be from enemy aircraft 
18Sundry Legislation .Af'f'ectiiE .!1!.! Naval Establishment, 1927-1928, 
1345-46. 
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carriers reaching a distance from which it would be possible to send out 
planes to raid our coast cities. 
Next to guarding continental United States, the safeguarding ot the 
panama Canal is necessary. Strategically our canal is ot great importance 
since war vessels can pass through it from ocean to ocean with great expedi-
ency. Commercially, also, the canal is ot value and the United States cannot 
permit its capture. While the defense of the camal seems rather simple, yet, 
in a war, air bombardments would be possible, again sent from airplane car-
riers, three hundred or tour hundred miles from the canal. In 1929, the 
naval maneuvers were planned to illustrate this possibility. Hidden by the 
night, the aircraft carrier Saratoga, supposedly ot the enemy fleet, sped 
toward the canal and got within ninety miles ot its entrance from which forty 
:f'ive planes took ott. Theoretically, these planes bombed the locks. or 
course with adequate air and water patrols this danger could be reduced to a 
minim.um.l9 
In the Pacific the question arises as to how tar the United States 
should extend its naval power. The imperialists of our country advocated 
that the Philippine islands must be detendecfP a defense which would require 
an extremely large navy since the f'orces would be maintained in waters tar 
distant :f'rom their homeland. The protection ot the Hawaiian Islands has been 
care:f'ully made. Pearl Harbor, located 2100 miles :f'rom San Francisco, is well 
:f'orti:f'ied. The harbor is laxge and deep and the largest vessels o:f' the 
l9New ~Times, Janmry 27, 1929. 
233. 
20Heari}!gs ot ~ Senate Committee ,2!! Foreign Relations, May 1930, 
,.....-
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,American :f'leet can enter it. It bas been considered a strategic point of' 
tirst importance by American naval officers and it has been built up to a 
high point of excellence and strength. Heavy guns defend it, and the bar-
racks, good roads, electric lights, the modern water and sewage system, its 
radio station, its submarine base facilities, its oil depot, its large dry-
dock and maab.ine shop to repair battleships, all contribute to make Pearl 
Harbor an extremely up-to-date strong base and a protection tor the United 
States against Japanese attack.21 
It was mentioned in the discussion of neutral rights that our navy 
was expected to guard commerce. In the case of Great Britain and Japan, both 
highly industrialized, populous, maritime countries, the imports from over-
seas lands is an absolute necessity. To these nations protection of' the sea 
lanes is as important as the protection of' their homelands. One important 
aspect of modern warfare is the struggle of' the warring nations for food and 
materials and the British are particularly vulnerable. Without their navy 
and air defense they could easily be blockaded. 
Fortunately, the food resources of the United States are so great 
that we would never need to fear starvation because of a blockade. Our 
wheat, fruits, meats, fish, and dairy products are sufficient. We have, of 
course, come to rely upon imported foods, also, such as coffee, sugar, cacao, 
and exotic tropical fruits and in time of war, the coffee situation could be 
most irritating. We are the greatest coffee users in the world;22 we import 
2lwilliam. T. Stone, "Outlying Naval Bases", Foreign Policy Associa-
.1!.2! Service, Vol. V, Nov. 15 , 1929. 
22:aenjam.in H. Williams, Economic Foreign Policy .2! the United States, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1929, 370. 
~----------------------------------~ ~ 
our entire supply and we would dislike having the importation of it cut off. 
However, its loss would not be disastrous. 
In regard to other raw materials, the United States is again fortu-
nate, but we do lack some of the products necessary for modern industrial 
efficiency. Particularly, do we lack certain minerals.23 Even though the 
United States produces about forty percent of the world's minerals, yet we 
must import other minerals.24 The Committee on Foreign and Domestic Mining 
Policy of the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America has list~d the 
minerals we laCk entirely and those of Which we have inadequate supplies--
nickel, cobalt, platinum, tin, diamond dust, antimony, asbestos, manganese, 
mica, and others.25 
The committee illustrated the importance of imported minerals by 
usi~ manganese as an example. To the steel industry, manganese is indis-
pensable.26 It is used as a deoxidizer, and a desulphurizer, and as an alloy 
to give greater resistance to steel. We do have a small supply ot manganese 
ore, but it could be mined only at great expense and would very soon be ex-
hausted. To illustrate how necessary steel is to modern warfare, Colonel 
William. P. Wooten explained that during the World War, the Allies used 
nearly t'WO and a half tons of steel annually for each soldier in the field. 
23c. K. Leith, World Minerals and World Politics, Whittlesey House, 
M~raw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1913, 13. 
24nid.' 48. 
2~or these statistics, see International Control of Minerals, 13, 
the American Institute of Mining, New York, 1925. -
26 ~.,53· 
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Since steel is absolutely essential to military equipment, and since mangan-
ese is absolutely essential to the manufacture of steel, our navy must make 
it possible for manganese to reach us at all times.27 
Besides certain minerals, the United States also lacks such products 
as rubber, whiob. we import from the British and Dutch East Indies, sisal trom 
:Mexico, manila from the Philippines, and shellac from India.28 The task of 
guaranteeing that these supplies will reaCh the United States at all times, 
belongs to the navy and it is a most di:f'f'icult if not impossible job. To do 
so would mean that the United States must maintain a navy strong enough to 
defend .American trade everywhere in any waters of the world, against any 
power or combination of powers. Theoretically this might be possible; but in 
practice such an aim is impossible of realization. If war should coma, the 
United States must expect to worry along without certain imports and look 
for new sources wherever possible. Since protection of commerce is suob. a 
hopeless charge, it seems more :f'easible to guarantee this by planning for 
peaceful and cordial relations with the world. When naval expansion became 
so great as to interfere with the maintenance of friendship with other 
countries it would do more harm than good to .American conunerce. 
27colonel William P. Wooten, "War Materials and Food Stuffs in the 
War Plans and Operations of the Army", 2£9-270, ru Academy .2f. Political~ 
Social Science, Philadelphia, 1924. 
28 
Benjamin H. Williams, ~· .£!!•, 370. 
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!!!! New Naval~' 12!2.-1921 
It was in 1919 that the world realized that a new naval race was in 
progress with Japan, Great Britain, and the United States the main partici-
pants. The World War had ended and the need ror our products ceased. Our 
connnerce was practically at a stand-still but the vast war-materials machine 
had to go on. It was decided to go on with the 1916 program. The second or 
the 1916 battleships was laid down in 1919, and a start was made upon the 
other eight. In 1920, the remaining eight light cruisers were also begun as 
well as the rirst or the battle cruisers. In 1921 we got started on the last 
rive battle cruisers.29 
By waiting until 1919 to begin our program we had all the lessons or 
the war at our disposal and as a result the new ships were to be so much more 
poweri"ul than the earlier dreadnaughts as to entirely outclass them~0 In 
December 1920, the Washington~ made a startling discovery: 
Within three years the United States will hold supremacy on the seas. 
After three hundred years or undisputed supremacy, the British navy will 
take second place, the Stars and Stripes will rloat ov~l a rleet stronger 
than the two rleets that rought the battle or Jutland. 
Calculations like this rested on the assumption that our new building 
would bring no answer rrom abroad, and that we could plunge into a project 
for supremacy without arousing other people's navalists. The assumption was 
unwarranted. 
-29 
Senate Document, 428, 623. 
30:Frederick Moore, America's Naval Challenge, Macmillan Co., New YoriG 
1929, 10. 
31 washington ~' December 18, 1920. 
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Japan was the first to eounter America's 1919 naval program with its 
eight and eight program and the naval race was well on its way.32 The Far 
East was no longer a land of' remote romantieism. Japan had seized Shantung 
and Tsingtan, erushing its way to dominance over China; she had oceupied the 
rormer German colonies in the Paeif'ic ~d planted a foothold in Siberia; she 
had strengthened her pUblic finances, extended her manufacturing and commerce 
and in general had taken a long step toward the goal nearest her heart--
ascendancy in the Far East. As one of' the three great powers of' the world, 
she challenged white supremaey. Her eight and eight naval plan was ambitious 
This was designed to give the Japanese navy by 1927, two squadrons each of' 
eight battleships and eight armored cruisers none of which should be more thaz 
eight years old. A third squadron was to be formed of older battleships. In 
addition, Japan planned to build twenty-six small cruisers and to inerease as 
well her submarines, torpedo boat destroyers and aviation flotillas. Last of' 
all, She proposed to erect a series of' coast defenses that would give her an 
impregnable line of' sea fortresses and naval bases from Sakbalin on the north 
to the Bonin Islands, and thenee to Marianne, Caroline, Marshall, and Pelew 
archipelagos in the central Pacif'i e. She would thus have a line of' military 
posts from the equator to the fiftieth degree north latitude, interrupted 
only by the American Philippines.33 
At the completion of' Japan's new naval plan, she would have only two 
capital ships fewer than America, and her ships would have been newer. This 
3~aymond Leslie Buell, ~Washington Conference, D. Appleton and 
Company, New York, 1922, 137-39. Also Frederick Moore, .2£• Cit., 71. 
3~aymond Leslie Buell, ~· .ill•, 139. 
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new development caused grave concern in the United States and Great Britain, 
while Australia and New Zealand watched with jealous hostility Japan's ex-
pansion southward. 
Naturally, England could not stay out of this naval race. The deep 
teeling with which the doctrine of naval supremacy was regarded was gi van ex-
pression by Winston Churchill, who said: 
Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of, or dream. of, or 
anyone may tell you, no arguments, however specious, no appeals, however 
seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the 
life of our country depends. 34 
Speaking in the House of Commons on March 17, 1921, Lieutenant-
Colonel Archer-Shea explained to his countrymen: 
By 1925, this great nation overseas will have built a fleet which 
will practically make obsolete all of the battleShips of our fleet with 
the exception of the Hood ••••• To meet this situation the government pro-
poses to lay down fo,u:--s}iips only this year.35 
But the four, it was said, would go to 50,000 tons apiece and would 
mount eighteen inch guns. The dreadnaughts we were constructing would be 
retired by these super-Ships. Another new American building program would be 
necessary, which VIOuld frighten the Japanese into a new building program and 
so on. Neither the United States, Great Britain nor Japan would stop as long 
as the other nations kept on. Yet, it would avail them little to match new 
ship with new Ship, plane with plane, gas with gas, for their relative posi-
tiona would remain the sane. 
Great Britain and Japan were limited by a depleted treasury. It is 
34a:. Bywater, Navies !:!!!. Nations, 21. 
35yamato IchihaShi, The WaShington Conference and After, Stan:t'ord 
University Press, Stanford University, 1928, 56. ---
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sometimes said that the United States had more money than Great Britain and 
Japan combined and could outbuild them. But would Great Britain and J"apan 
wait for us to finish such a gigantic plan? Very likely not. They would 
form a combination and strike before we were ready. The prospect of spending 
millions upon something so unstable that what one nation did would completely 
upset everything done by another could not have any popularity with the tax-
payer. 
It appeared that the continuance of the program was highly undesirabl 
and it was the height of statesmanship for the United States to invite her 
chief naval rivals to attend a conference to discuss the limitation of arma-
ments. 
It was on August 11, 1921, that the government of the United States 
invited the four principal Allied Powers "to participate in a conference on 
the limitation of armaments11 .36 When the Harding Administration assumed con-
trol of the government, there were obstacles before it. Anglo-American 
relations were strained. As has been noted, Great Britain was maintaining 
and increasing a vast fleet, but not only that was remaining a party to a 
military alliance with Japan which needed no renewal to keep it alive.37 
We feared that this alliance might be directed against us. Again, our rela-
tiona with England were strained due to the fact that certain Americans had 
5,Yffipathized too concretely with the Irish in their hopes of becoming free. 
With respect to the Far East and the Pacific there were unsettled 
36 11conterence on the Limitation of Armament, Report of the American 
Delegation to the President", Feb. 6, 1922, Senate Document 126, 67th Con-
gress, 2 Sess., 821. -
1 
37Ibid., 821-22. See also address of Mr. Balfour at the fourth 
P enary s~n of the Conference, December 10, 1921. 
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Questions Which had produced an international tension.38 Their adjustment 
was necessary before any naval limitation could be arranged. They concerned 
China, as well as the United States, France, Great Britain and Japan. Mr. 
gughes, Secretary of State, was anxious to get these international matters 
settled amicably. 
Besides, there was a strong current or public opinion in favor of 
naval disarmament. Appeals were sent to Congress, speeches were made from 
pulpits and platforms, articles appeared in the newspapers, all demanding 
that naval expenditures be reduced. It was difficult to see wherein it was 
practical to build battleships costing "nearly forty-million dollars apiece, 
which become obsoite and useless after fifteen years of peaceful floating 
about the seas"J9 Secretary of the Navy Daniels gave a statement to the news-
papers favoring naval disarmament: 
With reference to the naval program of the United States, there are 
just two courses •••• open. First, to secure an international agreement 
with all, or practically all nations, which will guarantee an end of 
competition in navy building, reduce the national burden and lead in the 
movement to secure and buttress world peace. Second, to hold aloof from 
agreement •••• with the other nations as to size of armament. This will 
require us to build a navy strong enough and powerful enough to be able 
on our own to protect Americans and American shipping, defend American 
policies in the distant possessions as well as at home, and by the 
presence of sea power to command the respect and fear of the world. 
Of the two plans •••• I press the first ••••• An international conference 
to end competitive navy construction was proposed by me in my first 
annual report in Decembe~ 1913, and proposed in every successive report 
and in every hearing before the Naval Affairs Committee for nearly eight 
years.40 
38Ibid., 109-10. 
39
"Navies of the World, To-day and To-morrow", Literary Digest, 71, 
November 12, 1921, 12-13. 
4°New !2!! Times, January 12, 1921. 
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In December, 1920, Senator Borah introduced a joint resolution--later 
embodied in the Naval Supply Bill which was approved on July 12, 1921--urging 
the President to invite Great Britain and Japan to a conference to draw up an 
agreement by which the naval expenditure of the three Powers should be re-
duced.4l This resolution was passed by both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives--in the Senate unanimously, and in the House by a vote of 230 
to 4· Also, in 1920, the Republican party had been emphasizing the necessity 
of the United States entering into some form of association with other nations 
for the reduction of armaments, and in June 1920, the Republican National Com-
mittee had warned its leaders that the party stood to lose a large number of 
votes unless naval expenditures were reduced.42 
The govermnent was thus carrying out the wishes of the people in 
issuing the invitation to the Conference, the immediate aim of which was later 
described in the following terms by the American delegation to the Conference 
in their report to the President: 
The declared object was, in its naval aspect, to stop the race of 
competitive building of warships whiCh was in process and was so dis-
tressingly like the competition that immediately preceded the war of 
1914. Competitive armament is, however, the result of a state of mind 
in which a national expectation of attack by some country causes prepara-
tion to meet the attack. To stop competition it is necessary to deal with 
the state of mind from which it results. A belief in the pacific inten-
tions of other Powers must be substituted tor suspicion and apprehensionfi. 
41 Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. LX, Part 3, 
p. 3740. 
42
"Republieans and the Leag:ue", ~ Republic, 102, June 23, 1920, 103-
43"Report of the American Delegation to the President", Senate Docu-
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~ Opening !!!.. the Conference 
It was in Washington, Armistice Day, November ll, 1921, a Friday. A 
10ng procession with President Harding, the ambassadors, the delegates, the 
troops of all BDRS, and poor ex-President Wilson had gone out to Arlington 
cemetery to take part in the ceremony of the burial of The Unknown Soldier. 
The whole city was drenched in tears. It seemed an appropriate introduction 
to the ep~chal naval disarmament conference which opened the following day.l 
The delegates from Great Britain, J"apan, France, Italy, Holland, Be]Sium, 
Portugal, China and the United States met in the classic building known as 
the Hall of the Daughters of the American Revolution. 2 This was to be open 
diplomacy and the place was crowded with reporters anxious to see and hear 
everything that took place at the square table in the center around which the 
delegates were seated. President Harding gave the introductory address con-
eluding w1 tb. the sentence: 
We are met for a service to mankind. In all simplicity, in all 
honesty, and all honor, there may be written here the avowals of a world 
conscience refined by the consuming fires of war and made more sensitive 
by the anxious af'termath.3 · 
Each country sent its foremost statesmen. The United States had been 
represented by four delegates, Secretary Hughes, Elihu Root, and Senators 
Lodge and Underwood, all of whom had established reputations in domestic 
politics. Secretary Hughes and Elihu Root were well known internationally. 
luanchester Guardian, Novan.ber 13, 1921. 
~rederick Moore, .2£• ..2!!.·, 87. 
3
conference on the Limitation of' Armament, Washington, Nov. 12, 1921-
~· .§., 1922, GovermnenTPrtnti:ng Office, 1922, Senate Document l25,7-s-
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]'rom the beginning the persuasive and convincing personality of Secretary of 
State Hughes dominated the convention. He was anxious to remove causes of 
friction and to build up good will. 
Without doubt, the climax of Mr. Hughes successful career came at the 
opening of the Washington Conference. In a speech, delivered on the first deu 
of the conference, he outlined in detail, practically all that was to be ac-
complished in the way of naval tonnage limitation. Offering to give up the 
,American building of capital ships in return for certain concessions from 
Great Britain and ~apan, he said: 
The first (consideration) is that the core of the difficulty is to be 
found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropri-
ately to limit naval armaments, competition in its production must be 
abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with respect to 
the method of its continuance. One program inevitably leads to another, 
and if competition continues, its regulation is impractical. There is 
only one adequate way out and that is to end it now. 
It is apparent that this cannot be accomplished without serious sacri-
fice. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under construction and 
building programs which are now under way cannot be given up without hea'VY 
loss. Yet if the present construction of capital ships goes forward, 
other ships will inevitably be built to rival them and this will lead to 
still others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue 
lasts. The effort to escape sacrifice is futile. We must face them or 
yield our purpose.4 
He then presented an exact plan for reduction Which he summarized as 
follows: 
1. That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or pro-
jected should be abandoned• 
2. That further reduction be made through scrapping of certain of 
the older ships.; 
3. That in general, regard should be had to the existing naval 
4 Ibid., 58. 
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strength of the powers concerned; 
4· That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement 
ot strength tor navies and a proportionate allowance or auxiliary com-
batant craft prescribed.5 
He also named the capital ships which should be scrapped by .America, 
Great Britain and Japan and which should be retained by each power. 
Charles E. Hughes' speech was a radical departure from the usual 
vague, meaningless statements which had been the ruin of previous disarmament 
conferences. The British writers Kenworthy and Young exclaimed about it: 
~e was sinking in a few sentences more tonnage in battleships than all the 
battles of the world had sunk in a centu:ry."6 
Iehihashi, who was attached to the Japanese delegation 1vrote: "It 
electrified the calm session; some were shocked, some were even alarmed, but 
others were pleased. It made the day a m~orable one in history.7 
Mark Sullivan, a seasoned journalist, described it dramatically in 
his book~ Great Adventure~ Washington. He gave the reaction to "that 
inspired moment", or various persons in the plenary session. He declared 
that Admiral Beatty of the British Navy "came forward in his chair with the 
manner of a bulldog, sleeping on a SUilllY porch, who has been kicked in the 
stomach by an itinerant soap-canvasser" and that "Lord Lee reached around ex-
citedly for pencil and papern.S 
5Ibid., 60. 
6J. M. Kenworthy and George Young, Freedom _.2! ~ ~' Horace Live-
right, NewYork, 1928, 155· 
lichihashi, ~Washington Conference~ .A:f'ter, 35. 
~k Sullivan, The Great Adventure at Washington, Doubleday, Page anl 
Company. , Garden City, 1922, 27, 28. -
28 
Miss Tarbell testifies that the Japanese •took it without the flicker 
of an eyelash" ,9 while Louis Siebold wrote: "There was no discounting the 
surPrise of Prince Tokugawa, Baron Kato, and Ambassador Shidehara. The 
Italians, Portugese, and Belgian envoys seamed to be greatly pleased if a 
trifle startledP10 
These writers had great reason.to be enthusiastic. They were wit-
nesses to history in the making at one of its most dramatic times. 
Idealism characterized the Americans. When Secretary Hughes reached 
the sentences, "There should be a naval holiday. It is proposed that for a 
period of not less than ten years there should be no further construction of 
capital ships,• he was interrupted by loud applause. The Americans present, 
in particular, applauded. "But what were they applauding?" asked Professor 
George H. Blakeslee of Clark University, who had served as technical adviser 
to the American delegation, "A proposalto surrender the potential command of 
the seas w1 thin the grasp of the United States. •tll. It appealed to the American 
people to sacrifice for a just cause--"equitable mutual reduction". 
At the second plenary session, Mr. Balfour arose and accepted the 
American proposals for the British govermneiit, 
not with cool approbation, but with fUll, loyal and complete cooperation • 
• • • • We have considered your scheme with admiration and approval, and we 
agree with its spirit and purpose as makipg the greatest reform ever 
carried out by courage and statesmanship.12 
9Ida M. Tarbell, Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise, The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1922, 45· -
1
<>:M. Sullivan, .2.1!· .21!·, 29. 
11Quincy Wright, Editor, Interpretations~ American Foreign Policy, 
(Lectures on the Harris Foundation, 1930), The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, Illinois, 1930, 29, 30. 
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~' The whole audience arose as in a theatre. Mr. Balfour had won tor England a 
position ot favor and confidence that was never lost.l3 
Then Admiral Kato spoke in Japanese, uttering sounds without visible 
movement ot his lips, as Japanese courtesy demands. His speech was trans-
lated as implying general approval, though with certain unnamed reservations. 
A good Japanese delegate must know how to say yes and no at the same time.l4 
Atter Chairman Hughes' unexpected and tar reaching propof?al at the 
tirst plenary session, two committees were formed--one to discuss limitation 
ot armaments ani the second, Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Each held 
numerous meetings where decisions were tentatively formulated tor submission 
in the plenary sessions. The several treaties and the twelve resolutions 
which resulted are ample proof that progress was made • 
..'!:!!.! Naval Treaty 
The starting point tor limitation and reduction was Mr. Hughes' point 
three--the existing naval strength. In ascertaining this amount it was 
planned to include "the extent ot construction already effected in the case 
ot ships in progress" and this definite quantity was to give the ratio be-
tween the several Powers. This was turther explained in the report ot the 
American Delegation to the Conference, which described the method followed 
in determining the ratio as follows: 
It was obvious that no agreement tor limitation was possible it the 
three Powers were not content to take as a basis their actual existing 
strength. General considerations ot national needs, aspirations, and 
l3Sullivan, Adventure,!! Washington, 53· 
l4y. Ichihashi, .21!· Cit., 42-43· 
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expectations, policy and :program, could be brought forward by each Power 
in justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength with no 
result but profitless and interminable discussion. The solution was to 
take What the Powers actually had, as it was manifest that neither could 
better its relative position unless it won in the race which it was the 
object of the Conference to end. It was impossible to end competition 
in naval armaments if the Powers were to condition their agreement upon 
the advantages they hoped to gain in the competition itself ••••• There 
was general agreement that the American rule for detemining existing 
naval strength was correct, that •••• by capital ship tonnage •••• upon 
ships laid or upon which money had already been spent •••• that ships in 
the course of construction should be counted to the extent to which con-
struction had already progressed at the time of the convening of the 
Conference.15 
The Japanese argued against the last point saying that a ship wasn't 
a ship unless it were finished and ready to fight , but they were won over to 
the principle that a completed percent was so much naval strength. Both the 
British and Japanese accepted the ratio which the American government had 
proposed.16 
This starting point being accepted, the United States Government pro-
posed to carry out points one and two, also, by scrapping six battle cruisers, 
seven battleships in course of construction, and two battleships already 
launched--and fifteen older existing battleships.l7 It was suggested that the 
British Empire and Japan reduce their navies in the same proportions accord-
ing to their "existing strength". The ships belonging to the three Powers 
were considered individually and in setting them off against each other, 
their age as well as their tonnage was taken into account. 
With regard to replacement, the proposals were as follows: 
15
"Report of the American Delegation on the Conference on the Limita-
tion of Armament", Senate Document 125, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 19. 
16
senate Document, ~· 126, 252. 
17senate Document,~· 125, 18. 
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1. That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage should not 
be laid down until ten years from the date of agreement; 
2. That replacement be limited by an agreed maximum. of capital ships 
as follows: The United States and Great Britain, 500,000 tons each and 
for Japan, 300,000 tons; 
3· That subject to the ten-year limit above fixed and the maximum 
standard, capital ships m:ight be replaced when they were twenty years old, 
by new capital Ship construction; 
4• That no capital ship should be built in replacement with a tonnage 
displacement ot more than 35,000 tons.l8 
Neither France nor Italy was asked to scrap any existing tonnage in 
capital Ships, since it was recognized that the relatively small size of 
their respective fleets would not constitute a fair basis for any sCheme of 
reduction.19 The Japanese asked for a replacement ratio of 10:10:7 instead 
of 10:10:6, and objected to the scrapping of their latest and most powerful 
ship, the Mutsu, 20 the construction of which was not quite complete. They 
were accordingly allowed to retain this, and in exChange the United States Wa3 
allowed to complete two new ships under construction and to scrap instead two 
older ships. 21 
On February 6, 1922, these five governments, United States, Great 
Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, signed a Treaty for the Limitation of 
Naval Armament whiCh was duly ratified and entered into effect on August 21, 
1923.22 The treaty provided that between 1923 and 1931, when replace~nts 
18 Senate Document !2,. 125, 100. 
19Ibid.' 24. 
20 ~., 20. 
21 ~., 22, 23. 
22 
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could begin, the status or the battleships or the five powers should be as 
follOWS: 
Country 
British Empire 
United States 
Japan 
France 
Italy 
Capital Ships 
20 
18 
10 
10 
10 
558,950 
5~5,850 
301,320 
221,170 
182,800 
The tonnage for the British Empire was somewhat larger at first, but 
that was due to the f'act that all her ships were older than those of the 
~nited States. Our ships, also, carried more guns than the British. The 
ships scrapped by the three great naval Powers amount to about forty percent 
of their capital ship stre~th built and building. 
Country Completed Building Total 
No. Tonnage No. Tonnage No. Tonnage 
British Empire 22 447,750 0 0 22 447,750 
United States 19 289,580 13 552,300 32 842,380 
Japan l2 192,751 4 161,958 16 354,709 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vessels Scrapped Under WaShington Treaty 
Beginni~ in 1931, replacements could be made so that by 1942 the 
capital ships of the five naval powers could be as follows: 
Country Capital Ships Tonnage Ratio 
United States 15 525,000 5 
BritiSh Empire 15 525,000 5 
Japan 9 315,000 3 
France No. not fixed 175,000 1.67 
Italy No. not fixed 175,000 1.67 
23con:rerence on~ Limitation~ Armament, WaShington, 1921-1922,236. 
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A sChedule defined in detail how and wnen replacements should take 
place. The Washington Naval treaty also limited total tonnage in aircraft 
carriers to 135,000 tons ror the United States and Great Brit~in and 81,000 
tons ror Japan while France and Italy were allowed 60,000 tons.24 
Finally the treaty provided that arter eight years, or in 1931, the 
United States shall arrange ror a conference or all the contracting 
parties •••• to consider what changes, it any, in the treaty ma~ be neces-
sary to meet possible scie~tiric and technical developments.25 
The treaty should remain in rorce to 19.36, and should continue in force until 
notice has been given two years previous by 8.liY party to terminate it. Thus 
was developed the policy or parity with Great Britain and five-thirds greater 
strength than Japan. 
Japan made it quite plain that her agreement to the naval treaty 
would be conditional upon .America's promise not to rortity Guam and Manila~26 
It was common knowledge that the United States planned to build naval bases 
at these points and to retaliate Japan had hurriedly completed the naval wor~ 
at the Bonim Islands and .Amami-Oshima. Hector Bywater, a careful student or 
the Far-Eastern question, said that the evidence or these serious naval prep-
arations had led many observers to believe that Japan might consider the 
beginning or work on the .American bases in Guam and Manila as a cause or war~~ 
24senate Document 126, 873· Articles .lli,, .Y!!.l, _!!, ,! or United 
States Treaty Series !!£. 6p.. 
25 Senate Document 126, 885. 
26Ibid., 21. 
27 Hector Bywater, Navies~ Nations, 149. 
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Japan considered these bases would be definite threats to her existing sphere 
of influence in the Far East. Secretary Hughes reluctantly agreed to accede 
to Japan's request that the status quo be maintained in the Pacific with 
respect to naval bases and fortification. Great Britain also assented to 
thiS principle. 
The treaty drawn up finally provided for the maintenance of the 
status quo with regard to the following Pacific possessions: 
For the United States: The insular possessions in the Pacific ex-
cept those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama 
canal Zone. The possessions to which restrictions would apply were the 
Philippines, Guam, American Samoa and the .AJ.eutian Islands. From that time 
on the United States would have to depend upon Hawaii for its furthest forti-
tied western base. 
For Great Britain: Hongkong and the insular possessions in the Paci-
fie, east of the meridian ofllO degrees east longitude except those adjacent 
to the coast of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The line drawn at 110° 
excluded Singapore from the operations of the treaty. 
For Japan: All her possessions in the Pacific except Japan proper 
plus all which me m:ight acquire later.28 
The effect of' this limitation is summarized by Bywater who stated that 
before the war the possible naval bases of the United States and Japan would 
have been so close that they would have been within easy striking distance of 
each other. The wide waste of' water whiCh has served so well to isolate the 
United States in the past would have been eliminated. When the status quo 
28 Article_!!! of Treaty, Series No. 671. 
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was decided upon the ocean barrier continued to protect the United States 
against a prospective foe.29 
The Position of France and Italy in the 
WaShington Conference 
Aristide Briand, the representative of France, was rather irritated 
at being ignored at the Conference. He felt that he had not been shown cor-
rect international courtesy. France was particularly annoyed at being con-
sidered along with Italy. She had large overseas dominions that looked to 
her for protection as well as seacoasts on both the Atlantic and Mediterran-
ean. The war had held up her naval construction, but since France was not 
willing to give up her historical claL~ of being one of the world's leading 
maritime powers, she believed she should be given the right to build up to the 
position She occupied in international affairs. Briand demanded a fleet 
well-nigh the equal of England's. The French navy is made up primarily of 
destroyers, sUbmarines, and cruisers and has been a very real force in inter-
national affairs. It is the type of navy England does not want as an enemy 
and it was the real reason for the Anglo-French Entente.30 
In apposition to France stood Italy, a nation old in tradition, yet 
YOlll€ in spirit, whose dream it is somehow to recreate the Roman empire of the 
Mediterranean. The maritime history of Italy is a long and glorious one. The 
sailors of Venice and Genoa bore the brunt of the war at sea against the in-
vading Turks, and the Italian Cabots gave England her claim to North .America. 
Unfortunately, Italy suffered from petty kingdoms, all intriguing against one 
29 I. Bywater, Navies~ Nations, 150. 
3°senate Document 126, 259-264. 
another. It is only natural that a finally united Italy should seek to re.:.. 
place the ancient sea power She lost centuries ago. Besides, Italy is very 
vulnerable to blockade for she lacks coal and oil, the very bases of' indus-
trial and military strength.31 
Anxious to win France's consent to the naval agreement and yet not 
willing to antagonize Italy, the naval committee proposed that both France 
and Italy could keep their capital ship tonnage intact; but in replacement 
both should restrict themselves to a maximum limit of' 175,000 tons with the 
right to lay down new tonnage in 1927, 1929, and 1931--the total for the 
three years not to go beyond 105,000 tons.32 As this placed Italy on an 
equal basis with France, it was satisfactory to her. France also accepted it 
although she pointed out that she would not accept such figures for auxiliary 
vessels. 
The ~-Power Treaty 
Since 1902, there had been an alliance between England and J"apan 
Which stirred up international suspicion, relating to equal opportunity and 
territorial integrity in China and Korea.33 If' either J"apan or England were 
at war with some nation about these matters and a third power should enter 
the conflict against them, then the ally must come to their assistance. For 
instance, in the Russo-J"apanese War, if any country had gone to Russia's 
assistance, England would have had to enter on J"apan's side. Japan likal the 
-
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33Frederick Moore, ..Q..E• Cit., 45f'f. 
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alliance, since it increased her prestige to be linked with England. On the 
other hand, England was anxious for J"apan to be neutral in case of any Euro-
pean trouble and naturally would like J"apan' s aid if there were trouble over 
the Far Eastern matter. 
The treaty was renewed in 1905 and 1911 with some slight changes, but 
in 1921 it came up for renewal again. J"apan wanted the alliance continued, 
since at that time she feared encroachments by the United States. Great 
Britain was undecided since the Pacific dominions were hostile toward it; but 
neither did Britain wish to take an inferior position as a naval power. When 
the United States showed herself willing to give up her huge ship-building 
program, Britain was Willing to drop her a;I.liance with J"apan. Mr. Balfour 
proposed a quadruple understanding for Great Britain, the United States, 
Japan and France,--the coUn.tries which had interests in the Far East. J"apan 
was not consulted about it at all in the beginning and was considerably an-
noyed.34 
However, a Four-power Pacific treaty was signed the text of which 
reads as follows: 
The United States, the British Empire, France and J"apan--
With a view to the preservation of the general peace and the main-
tenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and 
insular domionions in the region of the Pacific Ocean--
Have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect: ••..• 
I. The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to 
respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular 
domionions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. 
34y. Ichihashi, ~Washington Conference and .After, 115-30. 
If there Should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties 
a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their 
said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is 
likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between 
them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint 
conference to which the Whole subject will be referred for consideration 
and adjustment. 
II. It the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any 
other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one an-
other fully and frankly in order to arrive ·at an understanding as to the 
most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the 
exigencies of the particular situation •. 
III. This treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it 
shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period shall continue 
to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parti~ 
to tenninate it upon twelve months notice. 
IV. This treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance 
with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall 
take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at 
Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and J"apan, 
which was concluded at London on J"uly.l3, 1911, Shall ter.minate.35 
Everyone had e:xpected that something would be done about the .Anglo-
Japanese alliance at the Washington Conference and the first question put to 
the J"apanese de1egation by newspapermen was whether or not they would favor 
the abrogation of the agreement. In a prophetic manner, Prince Tokugawa re-
plied: "It would be highly beneficial to the maintenance of world peace, if, 
for instance, America, Great Britain, and J"apan could form an entente cordialtE 
in one form or another. ".36 
The Four-Power treaty was a sort of entente cordi ale and it made the 
great ocean off our western coast pacific in fact as well as in name. Dr. 
R. L. Buell summarized as follows: 
35senate Docrument 125, 111-13. 
36New York World, November 4, 1921. 
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As a result of the Naval Treaty, adopting the 5:5:3 ratio and the 
non-fortifications agreement, it is now impossible for any power to inte~ 
vane successfUlly in the Orient by force, if acting alone. By the Four-
Power Treaty, it is now impossible for Great Britain and the United 
States to combine their fleets in order to intervene jointly. Moreover, 
by the Four-Power treaty the freedom of the United States and Great Bri-
tain to bring diplomatic pressure against J"apan is also probably limited. 
consequently, as long as these treaties are adhered to, J"apan is absolut& 
ly supreme in the eastern Pacific and over Asia. 
At the same time, the Naval Treaty has made a successful J"apanese 
attack on the Pacific Coast impossible, because J"apan as far as capital 
ships are concerned, will have a fleet forty percent inferior to the 
American fleet; because J"apan has no real bases or fortifications in the 
Pacific this side of the Bonins; and because the United States retains 
the right to increase the fortifications in Hawaii. As a result of this 
treaty it has become a physical impossibility for the United States to 
successfully attack J"apan, and J"apan to attack the United States.37 
Newspaper Comments .2.! ~ ~-Power Treaty 
The Four-Power treaty received much newspaper comment.38 The Hearst 
papers, on the whole, were against everything accomplished by the WaShington 
Conference and. the ~ York .American admonished us that the peace pact was 
a "war breeder, not a peace maker". The govermn.ents of England, France, and 
J"apan were called imperialistic and militaristic. ''ro go into partnership 
with these international highwaymen is to become an insurer of their stolen 
goods--to pledge our military, naval, and financial help to the thieves 
whenever the rightful owners of the goods try to regain their property • 11 
.Arthur Brisbane, also a Hearst man, described England, France, J"apan and the 
United States as four "gentlemen highwaymen trying to agree not to cut each 
other's throas over the spoils". The treaty was said to be a great British 
diplomatic triumph. Another Hearst writer claimed it was a step toward our 
37Raymond Leslie Buell, ~ WaShington Conference, 200. 
38''Workabili ty of the Four-Power Peace Pact", Literary Digest, 71, 
_pecember 24, 1921. 
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recognition of the League of Nations. He wrote: 
Article eighteen of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides 
that "Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter 
by any member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the 
secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such 
treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered." 
This makes it mandatory to Great Britain, France and J"apan who signed 
the covenant, to register this new proposed agreement with the Secretariat; 
of the League of Nations, and the United States recognized the League ipso 
facto when it enters into an agreement which it knows, must be approved 
by-the League of Nations before it becomes binding.39 
Senators Reed and LaFollette were against the treaty, also. Reed de-
nounced the treaty as "treacherous, treasonable, and damnable", while LaFol-
lette asserted that it had "all the iniquities of the League of Nations, with 
none of the virtues claimed for that document" .39 
Although there was some adverse criticism of the treaty, the favor-
able criticisms far outnumbered them. The Houston Chronicle maintained that 
it was a good beginning, establishing a precedent for further agreements of 
the same kind, and summed up: 
Thus the Pacitic is to be made the home of a new policy--a policy ot 
reduced tleets, of fewer tortifications, of less aggressiveness, of 
reliance and peaceful adjustments.39 
Agreeing with this, the ~ ~ Tribune wrote: 
Concerts of this sort need not be limited to the Pacific, but can be 
extended to other parts of the world where stabilization is sought and 
where American cooperation is desirable.39 
The papers ot the west were optimistic. To take two illustrations we 
can read in the~ .A.I!geles Times that the Pacitic agreement was " a long 
I 
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steP in the direction of world peace" and in the Denver Rook:y Mountain ~ 
that it "brings very much closer the English-speaking peoples. tt39 
The foreign papers likewise praised the treaty, commending the 
"idealism in action" of President Harding and Secretary Hughes. The London 
~ilZ Chronicle seemed satisfied as it stated that 
it is now possible to regard the Conference as having put an end tor the 
present to the evil prospect at a Pacific armaments race and the fateful 
friction and jealousies in China and also as placing Pacific affairs on 
a most satisfactory tooting of mutual consultation, recognition, and 
guaranty.39 
~apan, too, was pleased tor in a Tokyo dispatch we are told that 
Japan consi&red her international standing raised and anything she might have 
lost through the abrogation of the ~apanese alliance with Great Britain, she 
has regained through the Four-Power treaty. 
~ Q,uestion .E!. Auxiliary Ships 
Limitation of navies is fundamentally a political problem tor nations 
must reach an agreement about the political direction of their nation to get 
results. It was possible to rea<h a naval agreement about battlefleets, be-
eause all agreed that a collision ot battlefleets was unthinkable, but when 
it came to the matter of the cruiser and submarine no agreement was possible. 
The principle behind the cruiser was the protection or destruction at trade 
and as there was no semblance at agreement as to when either side should have 
the right to interfere with the trade of the other, no agreement was possible. 
This involved the knotty question, "the freedom of the seas" about which there 
could be no political agreement. The main purpose at the submarine is like-
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wiSe the destruction of trade and limitation of it could not be agreed upon. 
It was France, however, Who advanced the strongest opposition to 
restriction of auxiliary tonnage. Her agreement to the capital ship tonnage 
depended upon the point that no attempt be made to limit her tonnage in 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The people of Great Britain advocated 
the abolition of the submarine in a resolution submitted to the Conference 
on Decanber 22, 1921. In the World War the submarine threats had brought the 
British face to face with the me~ace of starvation and they were anxious to 
do away with this instrument of death. Lord Lee, the principal spokesman of 
the delegation on the subject, advanced an. elaborate argument to prove that 
the submarine had very little value in protecting the coast lines, that it 
was practically worthless in an attack upon a naval vessel, and that its 
only use was to attack merchant vessels.40 
France wanted a submarine tollll8ge of 90,000 tons, a three-hundred 
percent increase of her existing tonnage. She wanted :parity with the United 
States and Great Britain in the submarine. This amount LeBon claimed as the 
absolute minimum "for all nations who may want a submarine force", and with-
out which France's vital interests would be imperiled. He argued that such 
amounts were absolutely necessary to protect her mainland and her colonies. 
It was his belief, also, that this demand should be allowed in compensation 
tor the position of inferiority which France accepted in capital ship tonnage. 
The submarine, he claimed, was inherently a defensive weapon and comparative 
inexpensive. 41 
4°senate Document 126, Conference .2!!: ~ Limitation of .Armament ,264-
41 Ibid., 278-284. 
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Here, then, was a f'undamental clash ot policies. There ensued a 
series of debates between the French and British delegates on this question. 
Britain took the stand that with Germany defeated, the French submarine 
could be employed with the greatest force against Britain, herselt.42 With 
thiS threat immediately befo~e her, she must refUse to accept any restriction 
of auxiliary surface craft, the only effective antidote of the submarine. 
The cold and cynical leader of the British delegation, Mr. Balfour, 
replied sharply to the effect that the 90,000 tonnage French demand 
constituted a someWhat singular contribution to the labors of a conteren~ 
called tor the diminution of armament •••• It was perfectly obvious that the 
proposed 90,000 tons of sUbmarines were intended to destroy commerce ••••• 
It was perfectly clear that if at Britain's gate a fleet of 90,000 tons 
of submarines was to be constructed, no limitation of any kind on au.:x:ili-
ary vessels capable of dealing with submarines could be admitted by the 
Gover:mnent which he represented.43 
~apan and Italy had declared that the submarines if rightly used were 
an indispensable part ot their navies. Italy made it clear she would expect 
the same amount of tonnage as that allotted to France.44 The United States 
rather favored the British point of view--especially as there was great 
popular opposition to that type of vessel which had so outraged American pri& 
during the war. The American delegates, however, were guided partially by 
the report of a special committee appointed to advise them. An excerpt tol-
lows: 
The retention of a large submarine force may at some fUture time 
result in the United States holding its outlying possessions. It these 
colonies once tall, the expenditure ot men necessary to recapture them 
will be tremendous and it may result in a drawn war which would really be 
42 ~., 2<}6. 
43Ibid. J 298. 
44Ibid. J 289-90. 
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a United States defeat. The United States needs a large submarine force 
to protect its interests.45 
The .American delegates argued that the submarine had great value as 
a scout ship. After these discussions it was decided to cease further effor~ 
to limit auxiliary craft and instead adopt a compromise on the submarine 
problem. The delegates realized that the submarine had been used in a bar-
baric manner and to stop this they agreed unanimously to Mr. Root's set of 
resolutions.46 They were to the effect that merchant vessels must be 
ordered to submit to visit and search before they could be seized and that 
they must not be attacked unless they refuse to submit.47 If an attack is 
made, passengers and crew must be placed in safety and small boats were not 
considered places of safety unless the submarines were positive that another 
vessel would soon pick up the stranded people. If these amenities could not 
be observed, then, the merchant ship was to be allowed to proceed unmolested. 
This, in itself, was merely an agreement on paper among a few powers, and 
had, therefore, practically no binding force. Such rules would make the 
submarine harmless as a commerQe destroyer. 
The treaty drawn up as a result of Mr. Root's resolutions included a 
clause preventing the use of noxious gases and chemicals. It was signed by 
the delegates of the United States, Great Britain, japan, France, and Italy. 
The adhesion of all other nations was invited. 
45Ibid., 272. 
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What was finally concluded about the cruiser was more harmful than 
beneficial. On December 28, 1921, Mr. Hughes suggested that at least an 
agreement upon the tonnage limit of individual cruisers might be reached even 
though no agreement was possible for the total tonnage. Great Britain had 
just finished building four magnificent cruisers of the Hawkins class, which 
had a displacement of 9,850 tons and carried 7.5 inch guns, and these they 
were loath to give up. Possibly to protect them,48 Mr. Hughes suggested that 
no ship of war built in the future, except battleships or aircraft carriers, 
should exceed a displacement of 10,000 tons, nor should any such ship carry 
a greater gun than an eight inch. This was accepted by the Conf'erence.49 
This provision in regard to ten-thousand ton, eight-inch gun cruisers 
instead of limiting naval construction caused renewed competition. Mr. By-
water stated: 
It is morally certain that but for the stimulus which the treaty 
gave to their development, most if not all of the cruisers now under 
const5Hction would have been vessels of less than seventy-five hundred 
tons. 
The building of 10,000 ton 8-inch gun cruisers began almost simultan-
eously in several countries. In 1924, France, Japan, and the British Empire 
began building so-called treaty cruisers. A bill authorizing the construe-
tion of eight such vessels was introduced in the United States Congress on 
April 15, 1924 and enacted in December of the same year.51 
48 Congressional Record, Jan. 3, 1929, 1082. Senator Hale said that 
this was Mr. Hughes' idea. 
355. 
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The Chinese Situation 
Mr. Peffer, a careful student of Asiatic affairs hoped that the situ-
ation of China would be alleviated by the Conference. 
Here is an opportunity to avoid war--a war that may draw to its flame, 
yellow and white--if it fails, then war is brought menacingly nearer 
he declared in an article in November CantU£¥ magazine.52 
Of all the problems before the Conference, 
said Richard Hatton in Current Opinion, 
the most important to the American people is that concerning a practical 
and permanent settlement of those Asiatic questions which are universally 
recognized as the germs from which the next great war will be bred. 
First among these Asiatic questions, he stated positively, is 
the definite fixing of the status of China.53 
The United States government was really anxious to improve the Chin-
ese situation, but this was practically impossible. England and France had 
vested interests in China which could not be questioned. ~apan took every 
effort to evade the problem and the United States was helpless. China was 
too far committed to ~apan. 
This was possibly as disappointing to the Americans as to the Chines~ 
for we have been rather sentimental about China, that ancient country, with 
its fascinating history, and glorious achievements. Since the time of ~ohn 
Hay there has been an American movement to preserve China intact and indepen~ 
52 Nathaniel Peffer, "East Meets West at WaShington", Century, 103, 
November, 1921, 49-63. 
53 Richard Hatton, "Far East and the Conference on Armaments", Current 
Qpinion, 71, October, 1921, 435-39· 
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ent• We have urged her to develop her own resources and have done what we 
could to help. We have surely been the greatest educators of the Chinese, but 
still China lagged far behind Japan. 
The most definite accompliShment was the return of Shantung by direct 
agreement between China and Japan and the withdrawal of the most unsatisfac-
tory of the so-called "Twenty-One Demands". 54 There were f'ormal resolutions 
and declarations made regarding a Board of Reference for the Far Eastern 
Questions, Extraterritoriality in China, Foreign Postal Agencies in China, 
Radio Stations, and Ar.med Forces in China. There were three resolutions 
drawn up about the unification of the railways in China, but these included 
8 demand that China improve conditions for foreign travel.55 
Two treaties were drawn up regarding Chinese neutrality and the "Open 
door" in China which was signed by the delegates of all the countries present, 
including China herself, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal participating 
with the five large Naval Powers, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, 
France and Italy. 
These measures together with the Four-Power Treaty and the status-quo 
in the Pacific had to suffice China. She had to hope and believe that each 
country would exercise good will and carry out the pacific intentions guaran-
teed. 
54senate Document 126, 231. 
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Ratii'ication of the Treaty 
Since the United States Senate very often refuses to ratify treaties, 
the people :feared especially :for the Four-Power Pacific Treaty--the :foundation 
stone of all the Washington Conference treaties.56 
An interesting poll was made by~ Literary Digest of the leading 
newspapers of the country on the subject. They received eight hundred three 
replies out o:f which seven hundred three were :for ratification, sixty-six 
were against ratification, and :fourteen refused to commit themselves. Forty-
seven states were represented in these replies. Another canvass was made by 
the Committee :for Treaty Ratification of New York. The results of this were 
as :follows: 
1. The church :forces of the nation appear to be practically a unit 
in support of the treaties as they stand, as expressing the moral judg-
ment o:f the people. 
2. The civic organizations--commercial, economic, social and politi-
cal, --have expressed themsel v.es with similar unity. 
3. The educational institutions have been unhesitating in their 
support. 
4. The outstanding and representative bodies o:f women have rendered 
vigorous testimony to the same import. 
5. The organizations of labor have expressed themselves in heart~ 
accord with the :favorable action o:f the American Federation o:f Labor.57 
From this it would certainly seem that the people themselves were 
united in approving the work of the Conference. 
56New York Times Editorial, March, 1922, quoted in. 
57
"The Treaty Triumph in the Senate", Literary Digest, 73, April 8, 
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The Senatorial phase in the life of the treaties negotiated at the 
washington Conference began directly after the Conference closed its sessions 
on February 6. On the lOth, President Harding presented the treaties to the 
senate, making a speech in which he earnestly p~eaded for ratification, sayiig 
If we cannot join in making effective these covenants for peace and 
stamp the Conference with America's approval~ we shall discredit the in-
fluence of the Republic, render future efforts futile and unlikely, and 
write discouragement where to-day the world is ready to acclaim new hope. 
Either these treaties must have your cordial sanction or every proclaimed 
desire to promote peace and prevent war becomes a hollow mockery. 
Your government encouraged and has signed the compact which it had 
much to do in fashioning. If to these understandings for peace, if to 
these advanced expressions of the conscience of leading Powers, if to 
these concords to guard against conflict and lift the burdens of arma:m.ent, 
if to all these the Senate will not advise consent, then it will be futile 
to try again.58 
The debates in the Senate were heated, long, and drawn out, centering 
chiefly on the Four-Power Pact, with such questions as: Did the Four-Power 
Treaty imply the use of force? Was it a basis for security and peace? Did 
it involve the United States in entangling alliances? The group favoring 
this pact defended it Chiefly on the ground that it did not do so. Among 
those holding this view were Senator Poindexter of Washington and Senator Le~ 
root of Wisconsin.59 Meanwhile, Hannis Taylor, a prominent lawyer in Washing-
ton wrote articles in favor of the pact, calling its stipulations "war-pre-
venting agreements", which involved no entangling alliances. These were 
written into the Congressional Record.60 
58senate Document 125, Pages V-XII. 
59congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 2637-2641, 3234-3~ 
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In opposition were members of both parties. Senator Borah of Idaho 
commented that no American could have written the pact~l but later read a 
letter from Mr. Hughes in which he acknowledged the authorship. 62 
Senator Glass of Virginia opposed the pact on the grounds that there 
JII1lSt be some underlying meaning in it that was most satisfactory to the J"apan-
ese, since they seemed to be pleased about the termination of the Anglo-J"apan-
ese alliance.63 Charles E. Russell, journalist, author, and a member of the 
Special Mission sent to Russia in 1917, wrote Senator Borah that by joining 
the Four-Power Pact he believed that United States would aid England and 
Japan at the expense of helpless China.64 Senators King of Utah, and LaFol-
lette of Wisconsin also argued against the pact as well as others.65 Finally 
it was agreed that the United States would accept with the reservation that 
"there is no obligation to join any defense". The vote was sixty-seven to 
twenty-seven, a margin of four over the necessary two-thirds.66 
A scathing editorial followed in Mr. Hearst's New York .American, 
entitled "England Recaptures Her Colony". The accusation against the Senate 
61Ibid.' 3608-67. 
62Ibid.' 3779· 
63Ibid.' 3721-22. 
64Ibid.' 4781. 
65Ibid., 2638-56, 3477-78, 3721-22, 3779-97, 3842-50, 4006-80, 4173-
91, 4227-34, 4311-33, 4492-93· 
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;qas as follows: 
The Senate voted :f'or an alliance not with all the nations o:f' the eartl 
like the League o:f' Nations, but an exclusive alliance to guarantee the 
possessions and the indefinable rights o:f' the three aggressive imperial-
isms o:f' the earth--Britain, France and J"apan. They are the same three 
imperialisms :f'or ~e sake we have just sacrificed twenty-six thousand 
millions of treasure. 
The Senate commits the country to an exclusive alliance designed to 
protect the aggressions of J"apan against our friends Russia and China. 
It is an alliance to prop up the tottering British Empire. 
It is an alliance so threatening that to-day it is driving together, 
for self-protection the brains of Germany and the brawn of Russia, those 
two republics gasping for the breath o:f' life. 
The Senators failed us, opened the gates, let in the foreign :f'oe.67 
An Estimate of the Conference 
--
The Washington Conference was an outstanding achievement o:f' post-war 
diplomacy. It is sad that the good work begun in the establishment of secu-
rity and the preservation of peace has been allowed to pass into the region 
o:f' forgotten things. 
In the concluding speech to the convention President Harding com-
mented: 
This Conference has wrought a truly great achievement. It is some-
times hazardous to speak in superlatives, and I will be restrained. But 
I will say, with every confidence, that the faith plighted here to-day, 
~ept in national hg~or, will mark the,beginning of a new and better epoch 
1n human progress. 
Mr. Balfour, head of the British delegation, declared that the work 
of the delegates 
-
-
diminished national armaments and increased national s~curity; removed 
long-standing causes of offense and substituted good-will for suspicion; 
~?Literary Digest, 73, April 8, 1922, 13. 
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made peace less costly and war less probable.69 
In Japan we realized that a new spirit of moral consciousness had 
come over the world, but we could not bring ourselves truly to believe 
that it had struck so deeply into the souls of men until we came to 
Washington 
said Admiral Baron Kato, who headed the Japanese delegation and he added: 
We came and we have learned; and in turn we have, I think, given evi-
dence, such as no man can mistake, that Japan is ready for the new order 
of thought--the spirit of international friendship and cooperation for 
greater good of humanity--which the conference has brought about.70 
By diminishing the causes of war and decreasing the weapons of war, 
we have reduced the possibility of war,7l 
averred Albert Sarraut, speaking for the French delegation, and giving the 
Italian comment Senator Schanzer declared 
The Conference ma.i'ked the point of departure of a new era. 72 
Thus optimistically spoke the men who were intimately in touch with 
the wat"k ot the Conference. The world was not ready to benefit pem.anently 
from this experiment in Utopia--it still persisted in the ways of pettiness 
and greed and fear--but the fact that much was accomplished will make it a 
foundation for future endeavors. The Washington Conference deservedly stands 
as a commendable and significant advance in world affairs. 
69Ibid., 212-18. Also Senate Document 126, 65-70. 
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~ Effect .£! ~ Washington Conference 
~~American Naval Policy 
A decided change was effected in our Naval Policy as a result of the 
Washington Conference. The principle of naval dominance adhered to in 1919 
was changed to the policy of parity in 1922. Ending competition in the 
construction of capital ships, limiting the size of capital ships, cruisers, 
and aircraft carriers, restricting the calibre of the guns, and removing the 
friction in the Far East brought about this change. The most obvious benefit 
rrom this change in policy was financial, but the more important benefit was 
the lessening of the possibility of war. Friction between the United States 
and Great Britain was removed through the cancelling of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and the ending of the naval race, while possible trouble with Japan 
was averted by allowing her to be supreme in the Far East. 73 
So far, the development of our naval policy has been traced through 
several steps. Our original policy had been a modest one. Up to the Civil 
War and for several decades after, our fleet was expected to vindicate, first 
our independence, then our position on neutral rights. The purpose of our 
naval policy was a very definite one. There was no use then of that meaning-
less phrase, "an adequate navy"', meaningless because it fails to answer the 
question, "adequate for what'?" During the two decades after the Civil War 
we had very little use of a naval policy at all and it was not until the 
Spanish War with its unexpected development of imperialism, that we followed 
7~. L. Buell, The Washington Conference. Q.uoted in the Congressiona1 
Digest IV, January 1925. 
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the European nations into the extraordinary pre-\~ race in battleship build-
In 1916, it was we who set a new pace, when President Wilson called for 
a. navy 11 incomparably the most adequate in the world". 
The navy is considered to instrument of foreign policy, but some of 
our policies are such that they cannot be enforced except by a navy of excep-
tional strength. Our Open Door policy and the territorial integrity of China 
a.re two policies that belong in this class. PJ[y armed vindication of these 
policies by the United States alone would require victory over ~apan. To 
conduct hostile operations five thousand miles from our shores is a tremendous 
task and nigh impossible. Possibly those policies should be abandoned. 
With our changed policy of 1922, our navy was adequate to our his-
torical American policies, first the unquestioned defense of our independence 
single handed, then the realization of our international ideals in concert 
with nations of like mind. 
At the conClusion of the Washington Conference, our naval policy was 
' a very definite one--to maintain a navy equal to the British navy and larger 
by five-thirds than that of the Japanese. Our naval men liked the idea of 
parity. Something definite to wark toward. 
CHAPrER III 
NAV.AL DEVELOH\IlENTS 1922-1930 .AND LATER 
EFFORTS AT NAV.AL DISARMAMENT 
United States Naval Developments 1922-1927 
Secretary of Navy Denby outlined the American Naval policy in the 
opening passage of his annual report, made public on Decamber 4, 1922. He 
said: 
For the first time in the history of our country the Navy and Congrest: 
have a definite naval policy of building and maintenance standard to work 
to, a standard which is proportionate to our position as a world Power. 
The maintenance of this standard in all respects is necessary to our de-
fense and to our prestige. 
He then stated that the following had been adopted as the fundamental 
naval policy of the United States: 
The Navy of the United States should be maintained in sufficient 
strength to support its policies and its commerce, and to guard its Con-
tinental and overseas possessions. 
It is believed that this policy is sound and not subject to question. 
It should be true for all times and under all conditions. 
Then the Secretary said that having in view the terms of the treaty 
for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, the Navy department considered that it 
was the intention of our conferees that the ratio 5:5:3 should apply to the 
relative total strength of the navies concerned; and that therefore, the 
following general program had been adopted: 
To create, maintain, and operate a Navy second to none and in con-
formity with the ratios for capital ships established by the Treaty for 
the Limitation of Naval Armaments.l 
The Secretary of the Navy recommended that the United States build 
auxiliary vessels to match Great Britain and Japan. 2 
-
~ew York Times, December 4, 1922. 
2Ibid. 
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It would be appropriate here to say something of the naval construe-
tion programs which had been adopted by the Powers concerned since the signa-
ture of the Washington Treaty. The conference had only made a beginning in 
the settlement of the naval problem. The fact that the agreements reached 
was confined to capital ships should not be lost sight of and some of the 
powers had begun a new race--this time in cruisers. All powers had adopted 
the Washington maximum for cruisers--tenthousand tons with eight-inch guns--
as the normal type of cruiser. This new ship was referred to by Commander 
!Kenworthy as "a miniature or pocket dreadnaught, miscalled a light cruiser" .3 
The following table shows the number of cruisers laid down from 1922 
to 1928: 
Cruisers Laid Down from Feb. 6, 1922 to Oct. 1, 192s4 
W£· United States Great Britain JaEan France Italz No. Tons Guns No. Tons Guns No. Tons Guns No. Tons Guns No. Tons Guns 
'22 - - - - - - 2 7100 6-811 3 7234 8-6.1 1 - - -
2 5195 7-5-5" 
1 3100 6-5·5" 
'23 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'24 - - - 5 10M 8-811 2 10M 10-811 2 9941 8-8" - - -
2 7100 6-8tt 
1 5195 7-5·5" 
'25 - - - 2 10M 8-8" 2 10M 10-8" 1 10M 8-811 2 10M 8-8" 
'26 1 10M l0-8tt 2 10M 8-8" - - - 1 10M 8-8tt - - -
'27 1 10M 10-811 4 10M 8-811 2 10M 10-8" - - - 4 5M 
1 8300 6-8" 
'28 6 10M 9-8" 1 8300 6-8" 1 10M 10-8" 1 10M 8-8" - - -
TotalS 30000 15 146600 15 117085 8 71584 6 40000 
3J. M. Kenworthy, "The Next Conference on Disarmament", North-.Ameri-
S!!!. Review, December, 1925, 211. 
lt:Figures are taken from a Senate Connnittee Print Navies of the World, 
prepared for the Senate Com.mi ttee on Naval Affairs by the chairniaii senator 
Frederick Hale, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1928, 1-3· 
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Further appropriations had been made for additional building as fol-
United States--none 
Great Britain--two, 16,800 ton vessels 
.Tapan --one, 10,000 ton vessel • 
France --one, 6,496 ton vessel. 
Italy --two, 20,000 ton vessels. 
From these statistics we see that although the United States withheld 
cruiser appropriations immediately after the Washington Conference, other 
governments adopted extensive building programs in the vessels unlimited at 
Washington. In 1922 and 1923 the lead was taken by .Tapan and France, and in 
1924 England began construction. The British made no secret of the fact that 
they wished more cruisers than other nations. Lord Birkenhead and Sir Austen 
Chamberlain explained the situation to some visiting American editors, saying 
that as Great Britain could not put in a supply of food for longer than a 
seven weeks period, she was forced to have great cruiser strength to protect 
her trade lanes. 
In the United States a bill authorizing the construction of eight 
10,000 ton cruisers was passed by Congress on December 18, 1924 and appropria 
tion for five of these was made in the Naval Appropriations Acts of 1925 and 
1926. The .American Navy Department pointed out that the ..American Navy was 
much inferior to other navies in cruisers and that to put our fleet on a basis 
5Ibid.; also from "Should the United States Build More Cruisers" 
.2.9ngressi"''ilee Digest !!.ll' 14. 
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of equality with Great Britain, the construction of twenty-two large cruisers 
was necessary instead of eight, and Congress held back from making appropria-
tions for them in the hope that a new limitation of arms conference would be 
held. The desire that armaments be effectively reduced and limited in the 
interest of peace and economy was shown in the naval appropriations bills of 
1923, 1924, and 1925.6 
President Coolidge was in sympathy with the efforts to reduce naval 
armaments which in his estimation had two goals--peace and thrift. In his 
inaugural address he called for a display of reason rather than a display of 
force and said, "If we expect others to rely on our fairness and justice, we 
must show that we rely on their fairness and justice". 7 
Addressing the American Legion at Omaha, on October 6, 1925, he said: 
We have been attempting to relieve ourselves and the other nations 
from the old theory of competitive armaments. In spite of all the argu-
ments in favor of great military forces, no nation has ever had an army 
large enough to guarantee it against attack in time of peace or to en-
sure its victory in time of war. No nation ever will. Peace and secu-
rity are more likely to result from fair and honorable dealings and 
mutual agreements for a limitation of armaments among nations, than by 
any attempts at competition in squadrons and battalions ••••• ! can see 
no merit in any unnecessary expenditure of money to hire men to build 
fleets and carry muskets when international relations and agreements 
parmi t the turning of such resources into the making of good roads, the 
building of better homes, the promotion of better education, and all th~ 
other arts of peace which minister to the advancement of human welfare. 
In February of the year 1927, the United States renewed its plans for 
the reduction of naval disarmament, the phase that primarily interested us. 
6Congressional Digest.!!!!.' 14· 
7calvin Coolidge, Foundations _.2! ~Republic, Speeches and Ad-
dresses, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York and London, 1926, 196.-----
~ieholas Murray Butler, The Path to Peace, C. Scribner's Sons, New 
York and London, 1930, 189. ---
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President Coolidge took the plunge and a formal proposal was delivered at the 
Foreign Offices in London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo by the American ambassadors, 
to attend a conference to be held at Geneva for the consideration of the 
separate problem of .naval armaments and more particularly the limitation of 
those vessels which had not been covered by the Washington Treaty.9 
~ Calling .2.f. The Geneva Conference, ~ 
The Conference for Limitation of Naval ~ents had for its specific 
aim the extension of the principles of the Washington Conference of 1922, to 
auxiliary vessels, the class in which competitive building had begun. Mr. 
Coolidge included this idea in his invitation and said: 
The American government was disposed to accept in regard to auxiliary 
cruisers an extension of the 5:5:3 ratio with reference to the United 
States, Great Britain and Japan and to leave the ratio of France and . 
Italy for discussion--due consideration being given to national require-
ments.10 
Would this conference succeed where the Washington Conference had 
failed? Both France and Italy refused the invitation to send delegates to 
the conference, but later they did agree to send representatives as observers 
The French note, dated February 15, 1927, began in the usual diplomatic man-
ner by praising the ideals of the American proposal; then it went on in an 
unruffled strain to reject it. Several reasons were given. First, the 
authority of the League o:f Nations would be weakened i:f this work were taken 
from it; second, all the nations with navies were concerned in the limitation 
9Records of the Conference for Limitation of Naval Armaments, Geneva, 
1927, p. 7. This-rs-senate Documen~No. 55· Hereafter it will be cited as 
Records. 
10Ibid., 7• 
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o! cruisers, not only the five invited to the conference; and third, the Amer 
iean proposal had ignored the French contention that only total tonnage shoulo 
be limited, not the classes.11 Italy refused on the grounds that her geogra-
phiCal peculiarities made it impossible for her to commit herself to naval 
lind tati on.12 
Japan accepted Mr. Coolidge's proposal in an answer made public on 
February 19, but stated that the 5:5:3 ratio established at the Washington 
Conference for capital ships would not be accepted for the smaller ships.l3 
After consulting the governments of the Dominions the British government also 
accepted the invitation. The British note contained the following statement 
regarding Great Britain's position: 
The views of His Majesty's Government upon the special geographical 
position of the British Empire, the length of inter-imperial communica-
tions, and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies are well 
known, and together with the special conditions and requirements of the 
other countries invited to participate in the conversations, must be 
taken into account. His Majesty's Governments are neverthel·ess prepared 
to consider to what extent the principles adopted at Washington can be 
carried further, either as regards the ratio in different classes of 
ships between the various Powers or in other important ways.14 
In spite, however, of the refusal of two of the interested Powers, 
it was decided after further consultation to hold a Three Power Conference 
at Geneva. The first session opened on June 20, 1927 and the delegates from 
the United States, Great Britain and Japan tried to agree upon cruisers, 
destroyers, and submarines. The three delegations put on the table the pro-
posals of their respective Governments. 
llib.d 
---L.·' 
12Ibid., 
13Ibid.' 
l4Ibid.' 
7-8. 
10-11 
9-10. 
12. 
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The Three Proposals 
The United States came to the conference with a program based on 
parity, economy and security. It was defined by Hugh s. Gibson who said in 
part: 
The American delegation has come to the con:rerence with an estimate 
of what we consider equitable tonnage allocations in the various cate-
gories of vessels. We are prepared to discuss the question of tonnages 
fully and frankly in the light of our several legitimate needs •••• 
We have none of us a right or illterest to maintain a nav~ force suf-
ficient for our legitimate requirements of national defense. 
The American proposal in effect was that no change should be made in 
the prevailing limits to the size of ships, but that the three Powers should 
agree to limit their tonnage in each class of subsidiary ship--cruiser, des-
troyer, and submarine--to con:rorm to a 5:5:3 ratio. The following table gives 
this plan in practice: 
Government Tonnage in Tonnage in Tonnage in 
of Cruisers Destroyers Submarines 
United States 250,000 tons 200,000 tons 60,000 tons 
and to to to 
Great Britain 300,000 tons· 250,000 tons 90,000 tons 
150,000 tons 120,000 tons 36,000 tons 
Japan to to to 
180,000 tons 150,000 tons 54,000 tons 
We demanded parity with Great Britain for two reasons; first, to pro-
teet our foreign trade since there were same important products we oould not 
do without, as manganese, rubber, and tin, and second, to protect our right 
15 Ibid.' 24-28. 
6.3 
as a neutral which England had threatened to disturb in the past. 
The ~apanese proposal was that the relationship between the three 
powers, at that time, as indicated by the actual number or vessels built and 
being built, should be stabilized that hencerorth none or the three Powers 
should be allowed to build any new ships except ror replacement. This would 
work out roughly at a ratio of 5:5:4, instead of 5:5:3. ~apan did not want 
to scrap anything of value, nor did she want to begin a large and expensive 
naval program.. They would not agree to any limitation of eight-inch gun 
cruisers as a matter of principle except to declare that they would not build 
any further eight-inch gun cruiser except those already authorized, provided 
Japan were given a total tonnage of at least .315,000 tons for cruisers and 
destroyers carnbined.16 
Both the American and ~apanese proposals seemed simple, the ~apanese 
having the apparent merit or no ruture increase in the scale of expenditure, 
but not, on the other hand, involving any reduction. The .American delegation 
objected at once to the Japanese plan because of the change in ratio. 
The British proposal was complicated. It began by opposing the prin-
ciple of limitation of total tonnage alone, on the ground that the maximum 
sized ship (10,000 ton eight-inch gun) would inevitably become the minimum. 
The delegates, instead, proposed a reduction in the size of ships and guns 
and that the naval strength should be rationed on the basis or reasonable 
needs of the three countries. First, they suggested that there be a strict 
limitation of the 10,000 ton eight-inch gun ship, and second, that there be 
established a secondary type or 6,000 tons carrying six-inch guns. They 
16. ~·· .32-.34· 
produced definite figures. Great Britain, they said, required seventy cruis-
ers, and this number they refused to change throughout the conference. This 
~as absolutely necessary, thay declared, to meet its special needs.17 This 
n:u:mber of ships would run the total tonnage up to approximately 600,000 tons, 
and on this figure she would grant parity to the United States. This figure 
was twice the .American figure and would mean naval increase rather than naval 
reduction if we tried to reach parity. 
The plans were assigned to the Technical Committee for investigation 
and meanwhile the newspapers, daily, predicted failure. In criticism of the 
British proposals, the~ York Herald Tribune said: 
To revise the agreements as to capital ships and as to tonnage and 
armament maximum for cruisers, and to delay replacements in both classes, 
as the British suggest, would play havoc with naval equality. 
The British-backed cuts in tonnage and armaments ignore the importance 
to the United States of possessing both capital ships and cruisers of 
high steaming radius. They overlook an existing disparity in naval sta-
tions and bases ••••• 
It is not conceding anything essentially valuable to Great Britain to 
advocate smaller battleships, smaller airplane carriers, smaller cruisers, 
destroyers, and submarines, or to recommend sweeping reductions in the 
calibre of guns. To allow no auxiliary to carry a gun heavier than six-
inch would at a stroke vastly increase Great Britain's cruiser strength. 
She has many merchant ships which can be fitted with six-inch guns and 
converted quicKly into naval auxiliaries ••••• 
The Washington Treaty unwisely aggravated our poverty in naval bases 
and stations ••••• Our lack of bases further east than Hawaii compels us 
to maintain a navy of Washington Treaty units and requirements. It would 
be folly under such circumstances to listen to British pleas for unit 
tonnage which would ~ther handicap us and relatively to increase Brit-
ish naval strength.1 
17Ibid.' 28-32 
1~ew ~Herald Tribune, June 22, 1927, editorial, 16. 
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A London dispatch to the New ~ Times urged the British not to 
change their decision: 
We are glad to see that our representatives at Geneva have not in-
cluded smaller cruisers and destroyers in such a ratio as is desired by 
the United States, and we earnestly hope there will be no backsliding on 
this vital point. 
Such a ratio in these vessels would be grossly unfair to Great Britai~ 
as our insuiar position and dependence for existence upon sea cargoes re-
quire a much larger number of these vessels than can be necessary for the 
United States.19 
The Chicago Daily Tribune was bitter: 
British naval action in all her later wars has been to blockade her 
enemy. "C<?ntraband" is what Great Britain wishes to declare contraband. 
The guarding of imperial commerce in fact has meant an interference with 
neutral commerce, whenever it suited British interests to interfere. 
This has worked a serious injury to American commerce in the past and may 
do so again as long as the protection of trade routes is allowed to remain 
a British monopoly. 
Our interest in foreign trade •••• is increasing ••••• America is begin-
ning to outsell Britain in her own dominions ••••• At the same time our de-
pendence on the raw materials of industry which are not found in our 
country is becoming greater and without which our industrial system must 
stagnate. If not our lives, then our prosperity and our standard of 
living will be imperiled by cutting us off from the world.20 
The clash of opinion was in the main a clash between Great Britain and 
the United States. Since both governments had been genuinely anxious to re-
duce naval expenditure and the general danger of war, it was absurd that they 
could not ~ree on some means. 
After weeks of difficult and anxious discussion by the experts, after 
~1 three parties had consulted with their respective Governments on more than 
bne occasion, after the British delegation had actually suspended the confer-
ence by returning to London to consult with the Cabinet, it had been found 
1%ew York Times, :rune 22, 1927. 
2
°Chicago Daily Tribune, :rune 26, 1927, editorial, 10. 
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~possible to enter into a written agreement. The core of the clash was the 
cruiser. With regard to the submarines and destroyers some measure of agree-
~ent seemed likely. In the matter of further limitation of capital ships, 
YlhiCh had been informally suggested by the British delegates, an agreement 
seamed possible. But on the issue of cruisers the conference broke. Each 
side wanted the advantage. 
The first contention was over the question of parity and the British 
naval men did not want parity with the United States in cruisers. The Right 
Honorable E. S. Amery, formerly First Lord of the Admiralty wrote: 
We agreed at the Washington Conference to what is in effect an equal-
ity of battle fleet strength with the United States. But obviously it 
would be impossible to arrive at any similar figure with regard to the 
strength of cruisers required for commerce protection. For us~at any 
rate, a sufficiency of cruisers is a matter of life and death. 
Mr. Bridgeman, the chief British delegate said in 1926: 
It would be a very dangerous thing for Great Britain to allow it to 
be thought that we could be satisfied with a one-power standard in 
cruisers, for example. In cruisers, at any rate, we want to feel supericr 
to other countries.22 
At the conference he was not as frank for he declared: 
"It is not parity with .America that is troubliJJg us. We have not 
raised any objection to that.n23 
Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, did not agree 
with Mr. Bridgeman and in no uncertain terms he gave his opinion as follows: 
2~ight Honorable E. S. .Amery, "Great Britain's Weakness in Modern 
Cruisers", Current History Magazine, Vol. XX:, May 1924, 231. 
22:£c. Kawakami, "Hidden Conflict at the Three Power Naval Conference", 
Current History Magazine, October 1927, 108. 
23Records, 40. 
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"Therefore we are not able now--and I hope at no future time--to emboqy 
ill a solemn international agreement any words which would bind us to the prin-
ciple of mathematical parity in naval strength.n24 
Lord ~ellicoe gave as reasons why Great Britain should have more 
cruisers than the United States, first, Great Britain's inSular position and 
her great need for raw materials and food, and second, the great length of 
her trade routes and the extensive coast line of all parts of the Empire, 
which must be protected.25 
The United States delegates would not recognize that Great Britain's 
needs were any greater than our own and finally, England was forced reluc-
tantly to grant parity. 
The second problem confronting the delegates was the apportioning of 
the various units of tonnage. The .American delegation declareO. that it could 
. not agree to limit the number of 10,000 ton cruisers to less than twenty-five~ 
because, unlike the British Empire, the United States did not have a large 
number of naval bases strategically situated with respect to its trade routes. 
The United States needed ships with large cruising radius. 
It was at about this stage of the game, that the British delegates 
returned to London and came back with a new set of proposals. 27 The new plan 
provided a total tonnage for cruisers, destroyers, and submarines of 590,000 
~ondon Times, August 8, 1927. 
25:Records, 37· 
26Ibid.' 95. 
27Ib.d 
_1:...•, 174-77· 
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tons for Britain and the United States and 385,000 tons for the ~apanese. 
r-ne restrictions called for were objectionable to the United States. First, 
the 10,000 ton cruisers were to be limited to twelve for the United States and 
Great Britain and eight for Japan.28 Second, the total tonnage in the destroy 
er class could be used for vessels of 1500 tons and under, but only sixteen 
percent could be used for flotilla leader ships, i. e., vessels of above 1500 
tons and limited to a maximum of 1850 tons. Third, the retention of overage 
vessels to the extent of twenty-five percent of the total tonnage was to be 
allowed. 
~apan made a final effort to provide some solution and this Great 
Britain agreed to. She proposed that she and Great Britain declare a naval 
holiday until 1931 with reference to the larger cml.isers and give the United 
States a chance to catch up.29 The United States refused as it would mean 
that the number of 10,000 ton cruisers would be limited and that the United 
States would have to accept a small tonnage for the remaining cruisers. .After 
tour weeks of technical disagreement, each delegation was practically where 
it started. 
The United States delegation remained unbending in her argument about 
large cruisers and Great Britain remained just as unyielding in advocating the 
six-inch gun smaller cruiser. The American objection was due primarily to the 
tact that the British government had at its disposal 888,000 tons of fast 
merchant ships capable of being readily converted into cruisers with six-inch 
guns.30 
28 ~., 181. 
29Ibid., 180 appendix. 
3~ Ibid.' 179-80. 
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The Japanese delegates would not agree to a restriction of gun calibre 
tor Japan had placed eight-inch guns on Ships or 7500 tons. 
To summarize, Great Britain wanted a relatively large number· of 6000 
to 7500 ton cruisers; America wanted a free hand with 10,000 ton cruisers, 
since she had not much use for the small cruiser. It finally ended in dead-
lock and complete failure. 
Mr. Simonds, an American journalist, gave a sensible estimate when 
he wrote: 
"Equality in cruiser tonnage was at all times perfectly obtainable 
provided both countries frankly accepted the principle that the fleets were 
never to be against each other." 31 
Why _lli Conference Failed 
Why did the conference at Geneva fail? Who was to blame? Some 
critics have said that there was a lack of preparation. Vice-President Dawes 
touched on this subject in his speech at the dedication of International Peace 
~ridge connecting the-United States and Canada at Buffalo.32 Mr. Dawes said 
~hat in his opinion the lack of results at Geneva was due to insufficient 
inquiry on both sides as to the actual needs of the other. 
In England, R. MacDonald voted a move of censure against the govern-
m.ent as follows: 
That the House deplores the lack of preparation by the government and 
the military character of the British delegation which seriously contrib-
uted to the failure of the recent Naval Conference at Geneva.33 
31F. Simonds, "Naval Disaster at Geneva", Review of Reviews, September 
27, 1927, 270. 
32New York Times, August 8, 1927. 
-
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Mr. Baker, a careful student of the conference, pointed out that the 
conference was set in an environment unfavorable to the American style of 
open diplomacy which had proved to be so successful at Washington. Only three 
~lenary sessions were held in public--the main work being done in the privacy 
of technical committees.34 
The Geneva environment did not lend itself to the Washington type 
diplomacy. Writing on the ~atricals of diplomacy, Kenworthy and Young des-
cribe the atmosphere necessary to successfUl American methods: 
For Americans do not yet seem to have learned how important atmosphere 
is for the proper producing of their diplomacy by popular appeal. This 
new diplomacy of theirs with a good producer, the "star" parts well filled 
and featured, and the "stunts" carefully staged, will beat the old diplo-
macy all the time. But all diplomats know that off their own grounds, in 
unfamiliar surroundings, Americans lose confidence in their own ways of 
playing the diplomatic game and are likely to copy the ways of Europe with 
disastrous results to themselves.35 
The man in the streets of the cities of the United States, Great Bri-
~ain, and Japan alike found cynical criticisms in the newspaper to suit his 
~ood. To cite two illustrations: 
"Responsibility for the deplorable outcome," wrote the Chicago Daily 
~' rests principally with the British experts and their reactionary sup-
IPorters in the Baldwin Cabinet • .36 
The British viewpoint was shown by a headline in the Liberal Mancheste 
~uardian: "Conference Imperiled by the United States Insistence on Super-
Pruisers." 37 
34J. P. Noel Baker, Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference, The 
~ogarth Press, London, 1927, 9· ---
35Kenworthy and Young, .£E.* Cit • , 168-69. 
36Chicago Daily News, July 15, 1927. 
37Monl"h<><>+.<>.,. 11. • .:..: T..,,,.,. 1/.. _1_022_ 
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Practically all writers on the subject agreed that failure was due to 
tne fact that the delegates were predominantly naval men whose whole profes-
sional careers have been a training toward striving for superior navies, not 
equal ones. 
Mr. Villard writing in the Nation stated: 
Thus, it has always seemed to me the height of stupidity, if not in-
sincerity, for our Presidents to send navy officers to naval disarmament 
conferences. They can not be zealous for the decrease of the navy.3S 
It is true that the delegations were composed of a very large number 
of technical naval officers. No member of the American delegation could boast 
of an established reputation for statesmanship. Hugh Gibson, United States 
minister to Switzerland and Admiral Hilary ~ones were our delegates and up to 
that time neither had been extremely prominent in public affairs. Mr. Gibson 
was capable and well-trained, but he was just beginning his career. Aclmiral 
Jones was thoroughly familiar with the technical aspects of the subject, but 
his whole viewpoint was one-sided. In addition there were eight naval ad-
visers, one legal adviser, one State-Department adviser, a secretariat of 
four persons and one archivist on hand to assist the American delegates.39 
The other delegations were likewise encircled with naval advice and 
Showed but little eminence in their personnel. Great Britain sent four dele-
gates, only one having an outstanding reputation, Viscount Cecil, but he was 
controlled by the cabinet at London. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand also 
sent naval officers. Of the two ~apanese delegates, one was an admiral, while 
in addition there were sixteen navy men attached to give advice. 
3So. G. Villard, "Some Vested Interests", Nation, 140, ~anuary 16, 
1935' 63. 
39R. Buell, Anglo-American Naval Understanding, 180. 
These men thought of war and not of peace. To them, national safety 
was of greatest importance. It was their responsibility to protect the peo-
ple of their respective countries and to see to it that they were not en-
dangered to the least degree.40 
.Although the conference may be termed a failure, it was not truly 
without result, for the publicity and discussion had called attention to the 
seriousness of the problem. The points of conflict became known, and the 
inlportance of taking the matter out of the hands of the naval experts was 
seen. As a preliminary event it was successful. 
United States Naval Developments 1927-1929 
As a result of the failure of the Geneva Conference the tension be-
tween the English-speaking nations was increased and the "most startling 
building program it has ever had to considern41 was brought before the Con-
gress. This program called for twenty-five cruisers, nine destroyer leaders, 
thirty-two submarines, and five aircraft carriers, at a total cost of $725,-
000,000. There was too much opposition for the Congress to pass this bill, 
but in February 1929, a bill was passed that still called for a rather large 
construction program. This new bill called for fifteen cruisers, and one 
aircraft carrier and was to cost $274,000,000. A time limit was added re-
quiring that all fifteen of the eight-inch gun cruisers be started by July 1, 
1931 and finished about 1934 and 1935. The only concession made to the 
president was the authorization to suspend building if an international agre~ 
40Ibid., 180 0 
41Arthur Bullard, American Diplomacy in the Modern World, University 
Of PennsylVania Press, Philadelphia, 1928, 124. --
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-ent for further limitation of naval armaments was concluded.42 
In February 1929, Congressman Fred Britten, chairman of the House 
committee on Naval Affairs and a leader of the "big navy" group in the United 
states wrote that the completion of fifteen American cruisers authorized in 
1929 
will, unless Great Britian or Japan extend their naval programs, place 
the United States on a basis somewhere near equality with any other naval 
force it might be called upon to meet.-4.3 
By referring to the table of the three leading navies and comparing 
the two largest fleets--that of the United States and Great Britain--we find 
Mr. Britten's statement to be a fact.44 If the 1929 programs would be com-
pleted Great Britain would have a naval superiority in cruisers, but that 
would be offset by the fact that we would have five large eight-inch gun 
cruisers more than the British plus a superiority in destroyers and submarines 
It seemed as if another naval race might be looming in the near future, unless 
something definite could be done to limit naval armaments. 
42R. L. Buell, ~· Cit., 182. 
4\-ew York Herald Tribune Magazine, February 21, 1929. 
44rhe table following compiled from statistics "Navies of the World", 
Foreign Policy Association, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 
1929. Also from "Comparison of Leading Navies", Congressional Digest, VIII, 
October, 1929, 239-240. (Table on Page 74). 
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Comparison 2.! LeadiDg Navies, Sept. &, ~ 
The United States Navy 
1-
Under 
Type Built Construction Authorized Total 
- No. Tons ~· Tons No. Tons No. Tons IS 525,850 -- - IS 525,850 capital ships 
Aircraft carriers 3 76,286 1 13,800 4 90,086 
Sin· gun cruisers 2 20,000 11 110,000 10 100,000) 33 305,000 
6in· 7.51n gun ) 
cruisers 10 75,000 ) 
Destroyers 284 290,304 284 290,304 
Submarines 108 77,o62 2 5,520 3 4,650 113 87,232 
Total 1,298,472 
British Nav:v 
Under 
Type Built Construction Auth.Grized Total 
No. Tons ~· Tons No. Tons No. Tons 2o 556,350 - - - 556,350 Capital ships 20 
Aircraft carriers 5 92,850 1 22,500 6 115,350 
Sin. gun cruisers 10 100,000 7 66,800 1 10,000) 64 407,690 
6in. 7. 5in. gun ) 
cruisers 44 217,890 2 13,000) 
Destroyers 153 159,280 20 26,960 9 12,160 182 198,400 
Submarines 50 42,061 14 21,860 6 9,420 70 73,341 
Total 1,351,131 
Japanese Nary 
Under 
Type Built Construction Authorized Total 
No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons No. Tons 
Capital ships -- - - - -10 301,320 10 301,320 
Aircraft carriers 3 61,270 3 61,270 
Sin. gun cruisers 5 38,400 6 60,000 1 10,000) 33 213,955 
6in. 7.5in.gun ) 
cruisers 21 105,555 ) 
Destroyers 99 102,190 8 13,600 8 13,600 115 129,390 
Submarines 61 61,357 6 10,220 4 6,920 71 '18,497 
Total 784,432 
-
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~ New Movement Toward Disarmament 
.An Anglo-American clash was a possibility. There was much written 
about "Freedeom of the Seas" and "Belligerent Rights", the two opposing doc-
trines of the United States and Great Britain. Advocating a big navy, Rear 
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske (retired) stated that the progress of civilization 
b.a.d always been accompanied by war, and that each nation should maintain arma-
ment in proportion to its wealth.45 An Englishman's opinion was given by 
w. G. Carlton Hal, who said that the United States thought nothing of violat-
ing a treaty and that they could always produce evidence to support their 
actions, even if they had to manufacture it "as they did in 1898 when they 
deliberately sank the 'Maine' in Havana Harbor to provide themselves with a 
casus belli against Spain" .46 He would have liked some new sea laws agreed 
upon whiCh would extend Great Britain's belligerent rights. 
A great number of writers on the sUbject were genuinely anxious to 
ease the relations between the two countries. Allen W. Dulles proposed a plan 
whereby a comparison of fleets would be more elastic. He had been associated 
with the delegation at Geneva and he realized it was impossible to make the 
British and American fleets exact equals in every phase--type, number, size 
and calibre of guns--when each had such different needs. He declared that the 
United States should make allowance for the great superiority in conflict of 
the larger cruiser and in figuring the size of navies the smaller cruiser 
should be calculated at a deduction.47 
45Rear Admiral Bradley i. Fiske, "Delusion of Pacifists", Forum. 81, 
February 1929, 75-77· 
4f>w. G. Carlton Hal, English Review, May 1929. 
4 7Allen W. Dulles, "Threat of .Anglo-American Naval. Rivalry", Foreign 
It must be remembered that the Kellogg Pact, the Multilateral Treaty 
tor the Renunciation of War, had been approved by the United States Senate in 
ranuary, 1929, just a month before the 1929 Naval Construction Bill was passed 
It was definitely inconsistent to renounce war on one hand, and build for war, 
on the other. On March 4, 1929, Herbert Hoover became President of the United 
states and in his inaugural address he made a passing reference to disarmament 
The recent treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of 
national policy sets an advance standard in our conception of the rela-
tions of nations. Its acceptance should pave the way to greater limita8 tion of armament, the offer of which we sincerely extend to the world.4 
In his Memorial Day address at Arlington, President Hoover made a 
straightforward appeal for arms reduction. No one knows the horror, the 
economic waste, and the ruthlessness of warfare better than Mr. Hoover. His 
remedy is to cut naval programs the world over so sharply to the defensive 
level, that there can be no competitive building. His speech in part follows: 
Since this day a year ago, a solemn declaration has been proposed by 
America to the world and has been signed by forty nations. It states that 
nThey solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that 
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controver-
sies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their rela-
tions with one another". 
They "agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or con-
flicts of whatever nature, or of whatever origin they may be, which may 
arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means". 
Despite the declarations of the Kellogg Pact, every important country 
has since the signing of that agreement been engaged in strengthening its 
naval arm. We are still borne on the tide of competitive building. 
The present administration of the United States has undertaken to 
approach this vital problem with a new program. We feel that it is useles 
for us to talk of the limitation of arms i:t' such limitations are to be set 
4~ew York Times, March 5, 1929. 
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so high as virtually to be an incitement to increase armament. 
We believe the time has come when we must know whether the pact we 
have signed is real; whether we are condemned to further and more exten-
sive programs of naval construction. Limitation upward is not now our 
goal, but actual reduction of existing commi~ents to lowered levels. 
It is fitting that we should give our minds to these subjects on this 
occasion; that we should give voice to these deepest aspirations of the 
American people in this place. That aspiration is that the world should 
have peace. 
Fear and suspicion will never slacken unless we can halt competitive 
construction of arms. They will never disappear unless we can turn this 
tide toward actual reduction.49 
President Hoover's willingness to attempt settlement of the naval 
problem, plus Ramsay MacDonald's anxiety to improve Anglo-American relations 
created a new atmosphere in the early months of 1929. At the president's 
direction, Mr. Gibson, the American representative on the Preparatory Com-
mission of the League of Nations, made a significant suggestion, which was 
later termed the "yardstick formula". He declared that 
in order to arrive at a basis of comparison in the case of categories 
in which there are marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might 
be desirable in arriving at a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage 
to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as age, 
unit displacement, and calibre of guns.50 
He had worked out a system of index numbers; 100 might represent a new ten-
thousand ton eight-inch gun cruiser; 60 might represent a seventy-five hun-
dred ton six-inch gun cruiser; and other numbers might represent the remaining 
vessels in correct proportion. 
49Chicago Daily~, May 31, 1929. Also State Papers, Vol. I, 64. 
5°nocuments ~ ~ Pre;parato!:f Commission for the Disarmament Confer-
ence. Minutes of the Sixth Session, First part), 56ff., Geneva, 1929. 
Q.uoted by R. L. Buell, Anglo-American Naval Understanding, 183, 184. 
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This speech was well liked. Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that it 
prepared the path for a "real advancen.51 
The "yardstick formula" made it possible for Great Britain to have a 
1arger number of small cruisers and a larger total tonnage, While the United 
states could have a larger number of big cruisers. Each could hB;ve what best 
suited their needs. The stalemate of the Geneva Conference was broken. The 
lo-American cruiser problem could be solved. 
Soon thereafter, President Hoover postponed construction of three 
cruisers and was severely criticized for so doing by Paul V. MCNutt, then 
ational Commander of the American Legion who argued that the United States 
should build ships. until parity was reached. The following is President 
oover's reply in part: 
Competitive building 
creates burdensome expenditures, a constant stream of suspicion, ill-will 
and misunderstandings. Moreover, by constant expansion of naval strength 
we cannot fail to stimulate fear and ill-will through the rest of the 
world toward both of us, and thus defeat the very purposes which you have 
so well expressed as being the object of the Legion, when you say "the 
Legion stands uniformly for movements which will make permanent peace 
more certain and assure better understanding between nations" • 
•••• I fear you have been misinformed as to the actual problems that 
lie before us if we are to succeed in such a negotiation, for they are far 
more intricate and far more difficult than can be solved by the simple 
formula which you suggest.52 
Another case which influenced favorably the disarmament movement was 
the Shearer incident. To explain this briefly suffice it to say that it was 
discovered that Mr. Shearer had been hired by same ammunition companies to do 
51London Times, April 29, 1929, 9· 
52:New ~Times, July 31, 1939. 
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?{hat he could to make the Geneva Conference fai1.53 Despite the denials of 
tnese companies, which were not believed, the people's wrath was aroused 
against interference with the disarmament plans by private corporations. 
Meanwhile what was England doing about the naval question? The Brit-
1sn government was very sincere about removing the ill-will produced by the 
misunderstanding. First, they slashed their cruiser demands from the seventy 
claimed at Geneva to fifty. Fifteen were to be eight-inch gun cruisers and 
tnirty-five were to be six-inch guns or less.54 Second, they made overtures 
to the United States .Ambassador, Charles G. Dawes. 
Since Great Britain was ready to make such great reductions, President 
Hoover called for a report from the General Board of the Unit ad States navy, 
stating the least number of eight-inch gun cruisers which this country could 
assent to. On September 11, 1929, the board gave its figure at twenty-one. 
These twenty-one cruisers would measure 210,000 tons and carry eight-inch guns. 
Fifteen six-inch gun cruisers of 105,500 tons were added to the board's ·es-
timate.55 
In a communication from Ambassador Dawes, August 31, 1929, it was 
pointed out that the Labor government of England could not accept our number 
o:f twenty-one cruisers, but they would not be averse to eighteen. Since the 
Japanese demanded a ratio of 10:7 in large cruisers, Japan would insist on 
f'ourteen, just one less than the British number. The British Dominions in 
53Discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this paper. 
54congressional Record, 73, July 15, 1930, 158. Also New York Times, 
January 11, 1930. 
55Treaty~~ Limitation of Naval Armaments (1930 hearings), 128. 
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the Pacific feared this small superiority would be insufficient.56 
It boiled down to the point where it seemed the only important differ-
ence was whether the United States should have twenty-one or eighteen large 
cruisers with. an additional number of six-inch cruisers to make up the tonnage 
of the three cut off the program. The problem did not seem insurmountable. 
It was at this time that Prime Minister MacDonald, democratic states-
man that he was, visited the United States. In an inspiring address to the 
United States Senate on October 7, he begged that naval rivalries cease. His 
speech, in part, is as follows: 
There can be no war; nay, more: it is absolutely impossible, if you 
and we do our duty in making the peace pact effective, that any section 
of our army, whether land, or sea, or air, can ever again come into hos-
tile conflict. 
Think upon that when we face many of our ov;rn problems of jealousy, 
problems of fear, problems the young and rising and successful generation 
put into the hearts of the old generation. They all disappear, and in 
virtue of the fact that they have disappeared we have met together and we 
have said, "What is this bother about parity?" Parity? Take it, without 
reserve, heaped up and flowing over ••••• That was the only condition under 
which competitive armaments could be stopped and we could create a public 
psychology which could _pursue the fruitful and successful avenues of 
peaceful cooperation.5? 
How different was this speech from the one made by Winston Churchill 
during the Geneva Conference period.58 
After conversations between Prime Minister MacDonald and President 
Hoover were held at the President's camp on the Rapidan in Virginia, it was 
agreed to call a naval conference. The British government issued the invita-
56Ibid.' 131· 
57 New York Times, October 8, 1929. 
58 Page 67 of this paper. 
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tiOnB for a meeting to be held in London January, 1930, to the United States, 
japan, France, and Italy. All accepted.59 
~ London Conference-~ 
~Aims of~ Conferees 
First, consideration should be given to what each country hoped to 
gain as a result of the conference to be held at London. For the United State , 
the most important point was parity with Great Britain. So much publicity 
had been given to parity in the United States that a treaty without it, could 
not be accepted. Our second aim was to extend the 10:6 ratio with Japan, al-
though that did not matter quite as much. We agreed with Great Britain that 
it would be a step forward to abolish the submarine, but disagreed with her 
about giving up the capital ships. We definitely took a stand against politi-
cal involvements that France wanted. It would be impossible to get a treaty 
ratified if it contained political obligations.60 
The United States did not intend to make the same mistake as was made 
at Geneva by sending an unsympathetic delegation. The one chosen this time 
was especially fine. The head of the delegation was Secretary of State Stim-
son, whose experience could not be denied. The following are some of the 
positions he had held: United States District Attorney for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, Secretary of War under President Taft, Special Agent to 
Nicaragua in 1927, and Governor~eneral of the Philippine Islands. Another 
59 Proceedings 2.f. the London Naval Conference, United States Govermn.ent 
Printing Office, 1931, 3· Hereafter cited as ProceedingS· 
60New York Times, February 7, 19.30. 
-
82 
delegate was Charles G. Dawes who had gained a world-wide reputation through 
hiS several posts--First Director General of the B~dget, Chairman of the Co.m-
,dttee on German reparations, Vice_president of the United States 1925-1929, 
and .Ambassador to Great Britain. Dwight Morrow was a third delegate who had 
earned his Government's grateful regard for his splendid diplomatic service 
in Mexico. The -fourth delegate was Hugh Gibson whose entire training had es.-
pecially fitted htm for the work. He had served the United States government 
on the League of Nations Preparatory Commission and had been the civilian 
delegate to the Geneva Conference. To represent the navy, Secretary of the 
Navy Adams was chosen. 
In addition to these five reputable men, President Hoover sent two 
~nited States Senators, David A. Reed of Pennsylvania and Joseph T. Robinson 
of Arkansas, both very capable men. Since a treaty must be ratified by the 
Senate, it is well to have some members of it favorable to the treaty and who 
are influential enough to sway the group. 
If the personnel of the delegation had anything to do with success or 
failure, then this conference Should succeed.61 
The British were divided into two schools, those who wished Great Bri-
tain to be supreme on the seas and those more practical who saw that this was 
impossible as well as unprofitable. It was difficult for the British to break 
away from their traditions, but it was still more difficult to foot the bill 
ot naval construction. The arguments used by the practical school were first, 
that the powerful navy had not been able to guarantee trade to the British 
61 
New~ Times, January 12, 19.30. 
-
83 
8J!'!Way, and second, that in modern warfare airplanes could cause waste, havoc, 
and devastation that the navy could not combat. The Labor government was on 
the side of the practical ones and it had won the friendship of America by itf 
cancelling of the construction of the twenty cruisers, and by its assent to 
our principle of parity. 
The traditionalists were still strong enough to influence the British 
in the view that they must have a navy equal to the combined fleets of France 
and Italy. Their route to the East must be kept open. Even this is illogical, 
tor here again planes will be a grave menace. 
Japan wanted security plus reduction. She knew that if Great Britain 
and the United States would agree to reduction it would benefit Japan in two 
ways, by reducing the possi~y of attack from either of these two governmentf 
the only ones she feared at this time, and by reducing the burden of taxation. 
However, it was very difficult to convence the Japanese that they were not 
•losing face" when they agreed to reduction of armaments and as a result the 
very lives at the delegates are endangered. A dagger sui table for suicide 
was presented to Admiral Hyo Ta.karabe, on his return from the London Naval 
Conference. He was denounced as a traitor for 
abandoning the demands of Tokyo under pressure of tyrannous .America and 
Britain 
and was 
urged to commit hara-kiri6to expiate his crime in concluding a treaty disadvantageous to Japan. 2 
In November, 1930, Premier Hancoguchi was gravely injured by a gun-
62
cable dispatch from Tokyo to.!!!!! York Times, May 19, 1930. 
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fib.o..f>3 and there was an outbreak in the J'apanese House of Representatives when 
the treaty was up for ratification, in which several were seriously wounded.64 
The J'apanese government had a serious decision to make when they ad-
vocated reduction. A second aim of J'apan was the retention of the submarine. 
T,hey use submarines very advantageou~y to repel attack and they were positive 
that they would not scrap a single ton of their 70,000 tons of submarines. A 
third aim was a 10:7 ratio, not a 5:3 ratio tor cruisers. 
The rivalry in the Mediterranean between France and Italy caused ap-
prehension.65 The Mediterranean is an important route tor both of them. The 
route to Africa nmst be kept open to the French. The French remember with 
sadness that it was because this route was closed that Napoleon failed in 
Fgypt. The Italian route cuts across the French route am to make her route 
sate, the Italians insisted on parity with France. France would agree to 
parity only on the Mediterranean, not on the Atlantic. If they could not 
agree, then Great Britain would not know how large her. navy must be to be the 
size of the combined French and Italian fleets, and the United States would 
have difficulty knowing what parity with Great Britain would amount to. It 
was bound to become a vicious circle. 
The Work of the London Conference 
----
On J'anuary 21, 1930, George V of England opened the London Con:rerence 
and the first plenary session was given over to polite, diplomatic speeches of 
6~ew York Times, December 11, 1930. 
64Ibid., February 7, 1931. 
65vera Micheles Dean, "France and Italy in the Mediterranean", Foreign 
Policy Association Service.!!,, No. 1, March 19, 19.30. 
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~riendship. At the second plenary session, J"anuary 23, the naval needs of 
each government were presented by the heads of each delegation. The most im-
partant presentations were those of M. Tardieu speakillg for Franc#,> and of 
stgnor Grandi speaking for Italy.67 Their irreconcilable aims were immediate-
y given to the conference to solve. No solution was possible. The French 
aamanded the right to build their fleet up to 724,479 tons68 and if Italy 
would build a like sized fleet, and if Great Britain wanted a fleet equal to 
the combined French and Italian fleet, their programs would perforce be ones 
of expansion rather than reduction. This would mean the failure of the con-
*'erence. The only possible solution was a security pact which would allow 
~ranee to feel sate Without building a large fleet. The conference was well 
acquainted with the American stand on alliances, and therefore a compact was 
proposed that would not bind the United States except as a consultant. Our 
llelegates, naturally; refused. The Times reported that 
the .American delegation had reached the unanimous opinion that the United 
States will not take p~t in any consultative pact in connection with the 
proposed London Treaty. 9 
l'he argument was that at some future time our consultation promise might be 
eonstrued to mean military aid as it had for England in 1914, when likewise 
111here had been no military agreements. Surprisingly, on March 26, our dele-
66Proceedings, p. 3. Also Documents 2! ~London Naval Conference, 
~930, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1930, l03ff. 
67Ibid., 109ft. Also Proceedings, 49-55· 
68Ibid., 519. Also Proceedi.Dgs, 55-56. 
6%ew ~ Times, March 12, 1930. 
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gates changed their decision, but even this brought about no solution. 7° 
;rrance would sign no pact calling for :parity With Italy; Italy would sign no 
~act that did not call for parity with France. The final outcome was to allow 
france and Italy to do what they chose about cruiser limitation. A happy way 
put of the tangle for Britain was the provision incorporated in Article XXI 
pf the final Treaty which allowed Great Britain to build up her cruiser str~~ 
if' trouble in the Mediterranean broke out because of the expansion of the 
,rench and Italian fleets. 
The problem of the ratio between the United States and Japan was set-
~led amicably. At first Japan insisted on the ratio 10:7, but since neither 
~he British dominions nor the United States would agree to this, a compromise 
~s finally arra.nged. The United States was to have eighteen cruisers (180r 
poo tons) while Japan was to have twelve cruisers (108,400 tons) making the 
~atio very close to 10:6 in tonnage.71 In return for this concession, Japan 
~as given parity in submarine tonnage as well as a higher ratio in destroyers7 
The British wanted a new settlement about battleships. According to 
fllhe Washington Coni'erence capital ship replacement was to begin in 1931. In 
~ ten-year period both the United States and Great Britain were to replace 
~ifteen capital ships and Japan, nine. Since the prospect of spending at 
~east forty million dollars on each of these capital ships was not pleasing 
1uo the taxpayers of the countries concerned, it was not too difficult to reach 
~ agreement about limitation of battleships. The British govermn.ent wanted 
70Ibid., March 27, 1930. 
7lsenate Document 1JI1, 34· 
72congressional Record 73, July 15, 1930, 162-63. 
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~0 abolish them entirely, but this the .Americans were not willing to agree to7 
The Terms of ~ Treaty 
One clause of the treaty called for a new naval holiday in the build-
ng of capital ships. No capital ship was to be replaced until after 1936, 
~hiCh meant a huge saving of money. In addition some ships were to be scrappee 
Lml!Lediately. Great Britain was to scrap five, the United States, three, and 
apan, one. As a result of this scrapping the United States would reach pari~ 
ith ~reat Britain in 1930 instead of in 1936, as was planned in the Washingtar 
reaty. A great amount of adverse criticism came from some of our naval ex-
~erts about this matter. It was said that the large ships were the backbone 
f the navy, the "infantry at' the sea". 74 Senator Hale, Chairman of the Sen-
te Committee on Naval Affairs gave the opinion of the navy group as follows: 
If the battleships are to be later replaced, and God forbid that 
statesman diplomacy should ever bring about such a calamity over the heads 
of naval opinion as not to replace them, the postponement of replacement 
is a~agous to the postponement of the payment of a note and nothing 
more. 
Another clause of the treaty gave a more definite definition of an 
aircraft carrier than was gi van in the Washington Treaty. The Washington 
~reaty defined an aircraft vessel as a war vessel more than 10,000 tons, 
~pecially fitted for carrying aircraft. If this were interpreted literally, 
~t would be possible to build any number of 10,000 ton aircraft carriers 
73Proceedings, 98. 
74 ~~Times, .Tanua.ry 17, 1930. 
75congressional Record, Vol. 73, .Tuly 11, 1930, 96. 
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without violating the treaty.76 The London Treaty took care of this point. 
!t defined an aircraft carrier as any surface vessel, whatever its displace-
ment, that was specially designed for carrying aircraft. The smaller vessels 
were limited to carrying guns of six-and-one-tenth-inch calibre, while the 
carrie~ of more than 10,000 tons were allowed to carry tan eight-inch guns.77 
The London treaty also provided that the decks of all new capital 
ships, twenty-five percent of all the cruisers and all the destroyers, could 
be fitted with landing-on and flying-off platforms, if the governments 
wished to do so. 
The United States, Great Britain, and Japan signed a limitation agree-
ment on cruisers, the conclusions of which can be shown clearly in the fol-
lowing tabla: 
Cruiser Tonnage Adopted at London, 1930 
Large cruisers (tonnage) 
Small cruisers (tonnage) 
Total (tonnage) 
United Great 
States Britain 
180,000 
14.3,500 
323,500 
146,800 
192,200 
339,000 
Japan 
108,400 
100,450 
208,850 
The sacrifice of the three 10,000 ton cruisers demanded by the naval 
board drew roars of protest. Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones in a speech to the 
Foreign Relations Committee argued that the 10,000 ton eight-inch gun ships 
were necessary because of the problem of long communications with which the 
United States is confronted and that this type of vessel possessed offensive 
76 Articles IX, X, Washington Treaty. 
77Articles III, IV, London Treaty. Senate Document~' 7lst Congress 
2nd Session. 
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and defensive characteristics that were necessary ~or such operations. 
Great Britain with its bases, 
he added, 
would be supreme if the United States had all its cruisers in six-inch 
guns. The nearer that condition was approached, the more powerful G~~at 
Britain became, relatively, and the weaker the United States became.·/ 
Admiral Pratt, on the other hand, commended the treaty. He said he 
would like ships with a variety of gun calibre. He said: 
I admit the eight-inch gun is a better shooting gun and I want some. 
I want absolute equality of fighting strength in action, or a little 
better, if I can get it. The eighteen-inch gun is better than the fif-
teen-inch, and the fifteen-inch is better than the twelve ••••• But you 
also need sixes. 
If we had only eight-inch gun cruisers, they probably would have to 
keep outside the fleet in action, as the~ must be protected. They are 
not like battleships in regard to armor.'19 
"As an expert," asked Senator Borah, "is this treaty satisfactory to 
you?"80 
"Yes, sir; it suits me. And when I say that, I remember that, if we 
had to fight , I'd have to do the fighting ,_41 
To analyze the sacrifice, let us compare ·the proposal of the General 
Board asked for twenty-one eight-inch gun cruisers totalling 210,000 tons. 
The treaty authorized eighteen totalling 180,000 tons. The difference is 
30,000 tons. The General Board asked for six-inch gun cruisers totalling 
105,500. The difference is 38,000 tons. The argument is whether the United 
7Bvvashi:cgton dispatch to New .!2!:! Times, May 16, 1930. Also Treaty 
on Limitation of Naval Armaments, Hearings before~ Committee ..21! Foreign 
Relations, U. S. Senate, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, 95-96. 
79New York Times, May 15, 1930. Official Publication Hearings before 
~ Senate~r~ Relations Committee, 12. 
80Ibid.' 71 
81
Ibid.' 71· 
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States Should have 38,000 tons in six-inch gun cruisers or 30,000 tons in 
eight-inch gun cruisers. It seemed a minor matter. 
From the conflicting opinions given it is clear that both the six-
inch gun cruisers and the eight-inch cruisers have their particular uses. 
Answering the senators, Admiral Pratt said: 
The eight-inch gun is a corker where you have clear weather and high 
visibility, but much of the time you have fog and all sorts of trouble, 
perhaps, ahead of you, and under thg~e circumstances I would prefer the 
six-inch gun to the eight-inch gun. 
To summarize, the six-inch gun cruiser is good for close-up work in 
resisting attacks from destroyers and submarines. Its guns can be fired 
twice as quickly as the eight-inch guns, they can be loaded by hand, and 
twelve guns can be mounted on each cruiser. 
The eight-inch gun will Shoot a greater distance, and in clear 
weather the eight-inch gun cruiser has the advantage in its longer range, but 
in thick weather when fighting is at closer quarters, the six-inch gun cruis~ 
is better. Senator Reed stated that there had never been a shot fired in a 
naval combat at a greater range than twenty-thousand yards and a six-inch 
gun can shoot that distance.83 This may of course be changed since air-
planes can locate the enemy vessels for the larger cruisers. 
Whatever the value of the two ships, our delegates were amply justi-
tied in accepting the compromise which made an agreement with Great Britain 
possible. 
82 
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In the destroyer class, Japan was given a higher ratio by the London 
Treaty. The United States and Great Britain were each allowed 150,000 tons 
and Japan 105,500, a ratio of 10:10:7.03.84 This meant a substantial reduc-
tion for the United States that was satisfactory, since we had built too many 
destroyers during the World War. 
It was more difficult to settle the submarine differences. The Brit-
ish view was given by Mr. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.85 He ar-
gued that submarines were wholly offensive weapons, whose warfare methods 
were horrible, and whose living conditions for the crews were exceedingly bad, 
He advocated abolition86 of the submarine, although it was impossible to con-
vince the French and Japanese delegates that this plan was teasible. M. Ley-
gues, French Minister of Marine, gave the opposite view as did Admiral Takar-
abe of Japan. The Japanese delegate argued that the submarine was an 
"appropriate medium of defense as a scout and an instrument to ward off an 
enemy attack in the adjacent waters of a countryn.87 
In an effort to humanize the submarine warfare methods, however, 
Article XXII was added to the Treaty. It reads as follows: 
The following are accepted as established rules of international law: 
1. In their action with regard to merchant ships submarines must 
conform. to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are 
subject. 
2. In particular, except in case of persistent refusal to stop on 
being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a 
84senate Document 121, 34· 
85Proceedings, 78. 
86Ibid. J 84tt. 
87senate Doeument ~' 30. Article XXII. 
92 
warship whether surf'ace vessel or submarine boat, may not sink or render 
incapable of' navigation a merchant vessel without having f'irst placed 
passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of' saf'ety. For this pur-
pose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of' saf'ety unless the 
safety of' the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and 
weather conditions, by the proximity of' land, or the presence of' another 
vessel which is in a position to take them on board. 
The high contracting ~ties invite all the powers to express their 
assent to the above rules. 
Japan was the master of' the submarine tonnage situation, since she 
had already a large tonnage built up. To prevail on Japan to make some re-
duction in her tonnage, She was given a ratio of 10:10:10. This was in-
eluded in the three-power limitation agreement. 
It is interesting to compare the results gained by the London Conf'er-
ence in limiting the tonnage of auxiliary ships with the desires of' Mr. 
Hughes in 1921. At Washington Mr. Hughes had suggested a total auxiliary 
tonnage of' 540,000 tons tor the United States and Great Britain and 324,000 
tons tor Japan. At London, the United States.was limited to 526,200 tons, 
not very much less, and Great Britain was limited to 541,700, not very much 
more. It Mr. Hughes had been successful, he would have been hailed as a 
master diplomat and statesman. At London, no one was given much credit, 
since drastic reductions had been hoped tor and not gained. It was only in 
the case of Japan that the figures of Mr. Hughes did not closely match the 
London Treaty figures. Japan had received a substantial increase from the 
Hughes figure ot 324,000 tons to the London figure ot 367,000 tons. 
In the Senate the fight over ratif'ication was prolonged by Senators 
Johnson of' California, McKellar of' Tennessee, and Hale of' Maine. At this 
88 Senate Document .!21• 40. Also Congressional Record, 73, July 15, 
1930, 162. 
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tune, the President's wisdom in choosing two senators as delegates became 
apparent, for Senators Robinson and Reed fought ably in the defense of the 
treaty. The.r denied that the United States had lost any of ita standing as 
8 naval power by pointing out that in 1930, ~apan'a cruiser strength was more 
than double that.of this country, and with that of England still greater. 
The opponents to the treaty often resorted to the radio to arouse the public 
against the pact. On J"une 25, 1930, Senator McKellar named the following 
argument against ratification in a radio speech: 
It gives ~apan the absolute control ot the East, and let me say right 
here What this means to the American people is Shown by the fact tha~ our 
trade with the East amounts to more than two billion dollars a year. 9 
W. T. Stone, of the Foreign Policy Association, praised the pact and 
the J"apanese saying, "I take my hat oft to the J"apanese government in this 
treaty.n90 He pointed out that, with J"apan's military traditions, it took 
great courage for Tokyo to approve the compromise agreement worked out by the 
civilian delegates at London. With this Senator Moses took an opposite view. 
He believed that"rh.e treaty hamstrings us in the Pacific by its unjustified 
and unfair increase in the ratio of J"apan.n91 
President Hoover called the Seante in special session early in J"uly 
to force through ratification. The battle still went on. Senator Copeland 
ot New York, opposed the treaty because it made insecure both American posse& 
sions in the East; he also favored the establishment of a naval base at Dutch 
89congreasional Record, Senate, '71at Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 72 
part II, 11753· 
90New ~Times, ~une 29, 1930. 
91 Congressional Record, 72, part II, 12047. 
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l{arbor on the island of Unalaska in the Aleutian chain. Senator Reed object 
to this on the ground that such a step would be an unfriendly act against 
Japan, to Which Mr. Copeland replied that the construction ot the naval base 
turnished a military advantage against Japan, which nation had won practical 
everything at London. Considering the difference in actual naval constructi 
and the difference in coast line and commerce lanes which had to be protected, 
the New York Senator agreed with Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones who said: "I 
believe that the ratio with Japan in reality amounts to 5:5plus.n92 
Senator Hale denounced the treaty in these words: "Never in the 
course of American diplomacy •••• have our interests been sacrificed as they 
have been in this Wretched Japanese fiasco.n93 
Finally, to hasten the end debate was limited to a certain time tor 
each man. On July 21, 1930, the vote was taken which showed fifty-eight yeas 
twenty-nine not voting, and nine nays. 
The accomplishments of the London Treaty were briefly these: {1) 
Great Britain agreed to accept naval parity with the United States, (2) the 
holiday on the building of capital ships was extended to 1936, and ( 3) lind ts 
within a system of ratios were set to the building of auxiliary cratt. 
In the decade 1921 to 193l, what may be called a legislative system 
of dealing with naval armaments was brought into existence. The great gain 
from the Washington and London Treaties was not the certainty of immediate 
naval reductions and the lowering of costs, but the demonstration that the 
armaments of a nation are the subject which can be properly considered by an 
international gathering--that rivalries can be settled by diplomacy. 
ume 
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CHAPrER IV 
FORCES INFLUENCDG TEE GOVERNMENT IN DE'.I'ERMINnG 
THE UNITED srATES NAVAL POLICY 
l 
The Opposing Forces 
All through this period of developing our naval policy there were two 
distinct schools of thought. One important section paid high tribute to the 
policy of abandoning competition in naval armament. This group included 
those citizens, said Ron. James V. McClintic, 
who take into consideration the economic and financial conditions of this 
country and the various nations of the world, keeping in mind that the 
ultimate object object of all the best citizens should be the mainten-
ance of peace with other nations, also keeping in mind that should the 
nation be so unfortunata as to become involved in a war that the kind of 
preparedness we should have would be the newer, more modern kinds ot 
defense that any nation will need to be victorious.l 
The second group included those people, who believed that our govern-
ment had made a grievous blunder in surrendering our potential supremacy at 
sea and in sacrificing actual tonnage for the sake of parity with Great Bri-
tain. Representative McClintic described this group thus: 
Those that can see a war cloud in the middle ot every sunshiny day 
and who continuously try to take advantage of every opportunity to in-
volve this country in great expenditures for the kind ~f preparedness 
that is believed by many to be useless in time of war. 
This division of our citizens into two classes had been brought about 
to some extent by our economic development and our emergence into the world 
of commerce and finance. Those who had made foreign investments knew that 
their investments could be destroyed by war and it behooved them to advocate 
peace. Business houses who wished to sell their goods abroad, knew that this 
trade would come to a standstill in time of war, and, therefore, they too were 
1
congressional Record, February 15, 1929, quoted in Congressional 
Digest VIII, 248. 
2 
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friends of peace. Unconsciously, perhaps, the world's industrial and finan-
eial leaders shrunk from an unseen danger--a danger well expressed in the 
words of Charles A. Beard: 
"Bolshevism waits around the corner for gentlemen who light-heartedly 
put the torch to modern civilization."3 
There is no doubt that international business had given respectabili t, 
to the movement for world friendship. This group advocated a small navy. 
Both groups of citizens concede that a navy is necessary, since all 
true Americans want their country defended, but the difficulty has been to 
determine how large that navy should be. In a clever article entitled "Our 
Confusion over National Defense. Shall we Listen to the Pacifists or Ad-
mirals?", Mr. Beard has written very amusingly about this topic. He claimed 
that neither side gave a satisfactory answer as neither group could decide 
exactly what should be defended.4 Let us examine the methods used by the 
two groups in their attempts to influence their government's policy. 
~Church and Peace Organizations 
The advocates of peace believed that friendship and good will among 
nations would do away with the need for large war machines. Church groups, 
which had long been associated with peace movements in this country had been 
greatly encouraged by the disarmament movement and had given it vigorous 
support. They organized foundations with the help of a few far-sighted 
3Charles A. Beard, "Prospects for Peace", _!!arpers Magazine, February, 
1929, 328. 
~arles A. Beard, "Our Confusion over National Defense. Shall We 
Listen to the Pacifists or Admirals?", Harpers Magazine, 164, February, 1932, 
257-67. 
~[philanthropists which made possible9:esearch and peace effort upon a salary 
basis. There was the "American Peace Society" with its headquarters at 
Washington and affiliated with all the Stat~ Peace Societies. This society 
had some very good workers including Dr. Trueblood, Edwin and Lucia Ames Mead, 
Charles E. Beals, William. ;r. Bryan and Woodrow Wilson. Then there was the 
•New York Peace Society" with Andrew Carnegie as its head. This society, 
also, had illustrious members--Fred Lynch, Samuel Dutton, William. Short, 
J. Seligman, Untermeyer, McAdoo, Villard, Strauss, and Gould, just to mention 
a few. One million dollars, one-third of Gi~'s wealth went to endow perma-
nent peace foundations and Carnegie gave ten million to the Carnegie Inter-
national Peace Society and two million to the Church Peace Union.5 
In the summer of 1929, Captain Dudley W. Knox, United States Navy, 
retired, made a serious accusation against the Federal Council of Churches. 
He charged that the Federal Council was influenced by foreign propaganda when 
they tried to prevent additional naval building and that they were financed 
by Sir Henry Lunn, an English philanthropist. The Church Council emphaticall 
denied the charges and invited Captain Knox to inspect their books at his 
own convenience. Dr •. C. S. Macfarland, general secretary of the council, 
declared: "Not one dollar has ever come from Sir Henry Lunn, or from any 
fund created by him, or from any British source, or from any organization 
with any foreign membership."6 
The Church Council received a commendation from the Secretary of 
5Merle Curti, Peace _2!: War--The American Struggle l:§..'&-~, W. W. 
Norton and Company, New York, 193b, 199-200. 
6
"The Naval Shelling of the Federal Council", Literary Digest, J"uly 
20, 1929. 
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state: 
"If the peace organizations and the churches are guilty of British 
propaganda, they are in harmony with the leadership of the highest officials 
in the United States government." 
The plan at the Peace Societies was to educate the public in inter-
nationalism by sending ministers, university men, newspaper writers, teachers 
and other praise-worthy people to spread good will among the nations of the 
earth. They believed that if the peoples of the earth knew and understood 
each other, there would be no need for fear and suspicion. They approved 
of peace pacts and treaties and publiShed documents about the costs of 
ann.ies and navies. They tried to prove that great navies and great armies 
had never prevented great wars. 
At one time arrangements had been made for eighty boys and girls 
around the earth to greet one another over the radio. One of them declared: 
"I think we can say the air all around the earth to-day is full of good-will 
greetings. n7 
On October 21, 1931, a banquet was given at the Waldorf Hotel and 
attended by many well-known personages. The headlines in the New York Times 
------
describing-it were, "Friendship Dinner. Goodwill, not Military Might". 7 
In the article itself we read in part: 
At ten o'clock the room was darkened in honor of Edison, and a pian-
ist played softly "Lead Kindly Light". Then upspake Sir William Robert-
son, chief of staff of the British army during a part of the World War, 
and said: "I want to submit now that another way can be found by which 
nations can live together without having periodical recourse as in the 
7New ~Times, May 19, 1931. 
l 
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past to butchery and barbarism. Give a will to peace in any way equal 
to the will to war Which nations were too ~requently taught to cultivate 
be~ore 1914. When disputes arise, approach them in a just and ~riendly 
spirit, as gentlemen, not as brigands". 8 
The group that advocates a large navy include the naval o~~icers, the 
patriotic organizations as the "Daughters o~ the American Revolution" and the 
Navy League, and the American commercial interests who thrive on naval con-
struction. Naturally, people whose living is at stake will do all they can 
to increase naval building not decrease it. The methods they used were much 
more to the point. 
The Naval ·of~ieers 
The issue involves the pride and zeal o~ naval o~~icials. They know 
from bitter experience that they are likely to be plunged into a war by an 
excited populace and still .ore excited politicians, and i~ they are not 
satis~actorily prepared, the result will be disastrous. They would not be 
human if they did not seek to secure all possible material support ~or any 
enterprise into which they may be hurled by the decisions o~ civilian author! 
ties who do not have to risk their lives in combat. Besides this, naval 
o~~icers have practical interests at stake; more ships, more posts, bigger 
ships and bigger posts, more prestige, honors, salaries, and stars. Said 
Congressman McClintic: 
There are approximately six hundred naval o~~icers in Washington; 
and all o~ these o~~icers desire at some time to command a great, big, 
~ine ship that has lovely and luxurious quarters. I~ I were in the Navy, 
to be per~ectly ~air and ~rank about it, I would want the same thing. 9 
~ew ~ Times, October 22, 1931. 
9copgressional Digest VIII, 248. 
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To show how the naval officers influence the increase of naval con-
struction again we refer to Mr. McClintic: 
It is known that the Navy already prepares practically all of the 
bills they desire enacted into law which relate to departmental matters. 
These are either given to the chairman or some member of the committee, 
who introduce same on the floor of the House; then they go back to the 
clerk of the connnittee, who refers them to the same source from which 
they originated, and a report is made. In many times the report is 
};lt"epared ahead of the time the bill is introduced.10 
From' tlfis information it would seem that the navy officials should 
be abl.e to carry through their own policies. In an interview at Geneva, when 
Admiral Hilary P. Jones was our delegate to the Geneva Arms Conference, 
September 13, 1927, he took exception to the term "big Navy Advocate as ap-
plied to naval officers and also to those members of Congress who are sincere 
ly solicitous for the defense of our national interestsn.ll. This white-
haired, grim-visaged veteran went on to say: 
There seems to be a very widespread opinion in our country that naval 
officers are fundamentally opposed to any movement looking to the reduc-
tion and limitation of armaments. Such an attitude of mind •••• is wholly 
unjust to naval officers and tends to discredit us in our earnest efforts 
to keep our national defense forces at the level that we honestly con-
sider absolutely necessary for national security. 
Nevertheless, we are anxious that that level be fixed by internatio 
agreement at the lowest point compatible with safety. We would be 
grossly negligent of our duty if we did not keep in mind always the de-
fense of our country and its enormous commercial interests spread all 
over the seven seas, interests which now e~ual and soon will surpass 
those of other nations. We have an inalienable right to parity in naval 
armaments with the strongest sea power in order that we may not be 
placed in a position of inferiority to any nation.12 
10 
Ibid. 
-
11Ibid. 
12Ibid. 
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We can not doubt Admiral ~ones' honesty but we can question the wis-
dom o:f sending him to the disarmament conference to agree on reduction when 
hiS opinion could not be shaken: "the navy insists that our right to equality 
with the strongest sea-power, in :fact as well as in principle, shall be 
recognized sine qua non o:f such agreement." 
Knowing that navy legislation originates with navy o:f:ficials, it must 
necessitate these officers being very well infor.med. But often they were not 
as the :following illustrates. On Thursday, April 17, 1930, Rear Admiral 
George H. Rock, Chie:f o:f the Bureau o:f Construction and Repair, appeared be-
fore the Committee on Naval Affairs o:f the House o:f Representatives to sup-
port a proposition to modernize battleships. A member o:f the committee, 
Mr. Lankford, asked the Admiral i:f the battleships to be modernized were com-
paratively useless in modern warfare, to which the Admiral replied: "They 
are not as efficient as they should be. nl3 
Thereupon the following was said: 
Mr. McClintic: "How many battleships did we use in the war?" 
Admiral Rock: "We were ready to use all o:f them. 11 
Mr. McClintic: "Did we fire a single shot :from a battleship?" 
Admiral Rock: "I think you are getting out o:f the line of my spe-
cialty. I am not a sea-going officer." 
Mr. McClintic: "It is true that they did not fire a single shot in 
that war. Is it not tru~ that most of them. were put away in reserve?" 
Admiral Rock: "There were no naval engagements on this side, but 
there we~e a, good many shots :fired during the last war on the other side." 
Mr. McClintic: "We could have sent some battleships over there." 
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Admiral Rock: "We did send some." 
Mr. McClintic: · "Battleships? 11 
Admiral Rock: "Yes, sir." 
·Mr. McClintic: "Where were they? Did they participate in any battle?' 
Admiral Rock: "They were in the Grand Fleet, but whether they were 
in the Battle of Jutland, I do not remember.nl4 
The Chairman (Mr. Britten): "So far as that is concerned, Count von 
Luck~er told me that the ship on which he was chief gunner went all through 
the battle of Jutland and never received a scratch". 
The act to modernize the battleships was passed, although the infor.ma 
tion supporting it was not very expert. 
At another inquiry, this time before a Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, in May, 1930, when the London Naval Treaty was up for ratification, 
Admiral Bristol of the Navy Board, after making it perfectly clear that he 
was opposed to the ratification of the treaty, went on to give his opinion 
about a possible war with Japan. He claimed that our interests in the Orient 
were great and that we ought to be prepared to defend our interests there 
against any power or combination of powers. He claimed that our navy should 
be able to wage an offensive war in Japanese waters, "on the principle that 
the best defense in the world is a decided offensive", and the fact that huge 
expenditures would be necessary did not appall him. Admiral Bristol's posi-
tion was definitely imperialistic and contrary to the statement given out by 
President Hoover on Navy Day, October 27, 1931.15 The ~ ~ Times gave 
14This battle occurred in May, 1916, almost a year before the United 
States entered the war. Hearings before Committee~ Naval Affairs..£!. the 
House of Representatives, 1929-30, 2035. 
l5Hearings before Senate Committee~ Foreign Relations, May, 1930, 
71st Congress, 2nd Session, 233· 
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the President's statement as follows: 
The first necessity of our government is the maintenance of a navy 
so efficient and strong, that in conjunction with our army, no enemy may 
ever invade our country •••• 
Ours is a force of defense, not offense. To maintain forces less 
than that strength is to destroy national safety; to maintain greater 
forces is not only economic injury to our people, but a threat agai~gt 
our neighbors and would be righteous cause for ill-will among them. 
Here was an example of a naval officer decidedly trying to undermine 
the efforts of the government in their plans for good-will between nations. 
~~Propaganda 
A great number of people are connected in some way with industries 
that derive their profits from naval expenditure. Many are employed in the 
steel and armor plate manufacturing houses, in the ammunition plants and the 
shipyards. Some are employed by coal and oil companies who deliver their 
coal and oil to the ammunition houses and shipyards. Others deal in naval 
stores, some are merchants vilo thrive on the wages of the shipyard employees, 
and so on to any number of allied lines. All these people, in addition to 
the owners of the companies themselves and the investors who hope to make 
profits in these industries can not be expected to cooperate strongly in 
naval limitation. Since they advocate the opposite, they will read avidly 
about the naval increases that are necessary and it is surprising just how 
much literature of this type there actually is. In fact, whenever the ques-
tion of naval limitation or any naval appropriations bill comes up for 
deliberation, the country is flooded with propaganda in favor or a big navy. 
16
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The Hearst papers carry daily articles about guns, tonnage, naval bases, tradE 
routes and supremacy on the seven seas which are most impressive. The Chicagc 
Daily Tribune, the Cincinnati E~quirer, the Seattle Times, and the St. Louis 
-
Star, to mention a few overwhelm us with their professional knowledge. 
-
For a time it was difficult to discover how and where this big navy 
propaganda originated or W:lo financed it, but "When a senatorial investiga-
tion revealed the character of the activities of Mr. W. B. Shearer at the 
Geneva Conference in 1927, who was a representative of shipbuilding corpora-
tiona, a huge volume of testimony was produced bearing directly upon the sub-
ject of naval propaganda.l7 
.!!!.! Shearer ~ 
Just who was William B. Shearer whose activities were investigated by 
the Senate? According to himself he was a patriotic exponent of sea power. 
In one of his letters he wrote: 
I fight internationalism, pacifism and connnunism. I make many 
enemies and many friends. I hate pink, red, and yellow. Enthusiasts 
claim I am the best posted man in the United States on national defense. 
I claim nothing and expect less, but whatever I represent, it is all 
American--which seems to arouse suspision as well as curiosity.l8 · 
Mr. Shearer won most of his notoriety through his work at the Geneva 
Conference where he mingled with newspaper men and naval advisers. Because 
of his forceful and evidently agreeable personality he frequently dominated 
the conversation in hotel lobbies and press rooms. His knowledge of marine 
matters appealed to journalists in search of a lead and he periodically 
l7"Alleged Activities at the Geneva Conference", Hearings before~ 
Subconnnittee of the Connnittee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 7lst 
Congress, lstsession, pursuantto Sen. Res. 114, Washington, 1930. Here 
cited as Senate Document 
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handed than mimeographed information sheets containing f'acts and interpreta-
tions, WhiCh were intended to be hostile to the success of' the conference. 
Later, when he brought suit against three ship-building companies asking f'or 
the sum of' $257,655 which he alleged was the balance due him f'or services 
rendered, it was discovered who his employers were.l9 
The f'act that the three companies sued had been engaged in building 
United States warships, and that Mr. Shearer had been an active opponent of 
disarmament roused the attention of President Hoover who on September 6, 1929, 
issued a ringing statement calling upon the companies for an explanation, 
which read in part as follows: 
This propagandist has, during the past few years, organized zealous 
support for increased armament and has been a severe critic of all ef'f'orte 
of our government to secure international agreement for the reduction of 
naval arms, which include activities at the Geneva Conference and opposi-
tion to the movement whiCh I have initiated in the past three months. A 
part of' this propaganda has been directed to create international distrust 
and hate ••••• I am making this statement publicly so that there can be no 
misapprehension of' my de~ermination that our present international nego-
tiations shall not be interfered with f'ram suCh sources and through such 
methods.20 
The vigorous and wholesale denunciation of the Shearer activities 
from the American press was "undoubtedly due to the specially dangerous char-
acter of' his meddling", wrote the Nation and it further declared: 
He was playing not merely with prof'i t s, but with countless human 
lives. Men can hardly embark on a more important enterprise than an 
international conference to reduce the horrors of war, and to poison 
th.e atm~phere of' such a gathering is as serious a crime as anyone can 
commit. 
l9Senate Document, 662. 
20New York Times, September 7, 1929. 
2Lrhe Nation, 129, Septanber 25, 1929, 316. 
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Analysis of Shearer Propaganda 
In analyzing the information made public at the Shearer investigation, 
and recorded in the "Alleged Activities at the Geneva Conference", Hearings 
before~ Sub-committee of the Senate Connnittee ..2!! Naval Affairs, .!..21Q., it is 
possible to divide Mr. Shearer's activities into four different types. The 
first was his promotion work in connection with merchant-marine and navy leg-
1 sla tion in the fall of 1926 • 22 One o:t his employers, Mr. Wakeman, o:t the 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation testified that Mr. Shearer "was to write 
articles :for the press, to make speeChes, and to supplement the work the 
Shipping Board was doing in connection with the merChant marinen.23 Another 
employer, Mr. Palen, of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 
gave the following testimony: 
After making one more address in New York, he (speaking about Shearer) 
expects to, spend some time in Washington after the opening of Congress in 
order to get information on the probable attitude o:t Congress and the ad-
ministration toward appropriations and backing for the navy and merchant 
marine, after which he Will start on his speaking tour, and intends to 
cover the entire country, speaking before gatherings organized by the 
American Legion, the chamber of connnerce and similar organi~f,ltions that 
will cooperate with him in getting the necessary audiences.~ 
Mr. Shearer himself testified that his contract called upon him 
to use my best efforts in the interest of the three-cruiser bill Which 
was pending in Congress, as you know, and under th~ law unless sufficient 
money was appropriated the bill would die in J"une. 25 
The second enterprise Mr. Shearer carried out for the associated 
22 
Senate Document, 133f:f. 
23Ibid.' 134· 
24Ibid., 635. 
25Ibid.' 465. 
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industries was his efforts to sabotage the Geneva Conference in 1927. For 
this undertaking he was paid $25,000. His employers were very hazy in their 
testimony as to just what Mr. Shearer was expected to do in Geneva. They 
claimed that his sole purpose was to have been "observing and reporting", 
but they denied that they had in view any kind of propaganda bearing on a 
big navy for the United States. They also testified that very few reports 
had come to their notice and to those that did they gave only a cursory glame. 
That may or may not be true, but they should have kept track of their em-
ployee's doings. They would have learned that he was very active in enter-
taining, giving out news stories, and advocating views favorable to the 
development of a large American navy.26 
In 1928, he was reengaged to spread propaganda for the mercantile 
legislation before our Congressfland in 1929 "during the fifteen cruiser 
fight". 28 This was after Mr. Bardo had sent him a fomal note of dismissal, 
explaining that anything he had done in addition to "observing" at Geneva 
had been on his awn responsibility.29 Mr. Bardo was one of the gentlemen 
who rehired Shearer in 1928. 
A third type of propaganda was the sending out of propaganda papers 
under the patronage of the Republican National Committee Publicity Bureau. 
For this work funds were provided by Mr. Wilder of the .American Brown Boveri 
26Ibid.' 656ft. 
27Ibid.' 652. 
2S 
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Company, of which the New York Shipbuilding Company was a branch.30 These 
pieces of literature were planned to discredit the patriotism and intelligmce 
of peace advocates, to promote the demand for a big navy and merchant marine, 
to capture the IriSh vote by criticism of Great Britain, and to take the 
towns, particularly Boston, which had shipbuilding yards. 
To quote Mr. Shearer: 
I went to Boston and the chairman, or the national committeeman, Mr. 
Liggett, who was running the Republican campaign in Boston, had been 
notified •••• that I was coming, and I presented myself and was received 
very graciously. I called on one or two of the newspapers. They had 
been notified that I would be there also. I went to all the Republican 
papers and all the Democratic papers, and they were fair. They each gave 
me very good publicity on the navy and merchant marine, and the fact that 
Boston was a seaport, and all the rest of it. They were interested 
naturally in the merchant marine. Then I went over to the Charlestown 
Navy Yard ••••• ! discussed the building of ships and the fact that ships 
would be built in Boston, possibly in navy yards. Bethlehem have a plant 
there at Fore River, and we have a navy yard at Boston ••••• So I got a 
considerable amount of publicity.3l 
Mr. Shearer's fourth type of propaganda was his work under Mr. Hearst 
from whom he received $2000 a month. He wrote articles, made speeches, or-
ganized the patriotic societies, principally against the League of Nations 
and the World Court.32 He declared: 
So I immediately started to send out my bulletins to the patriotic 
organizations of the United States and they immediately started sending 
in their resolutions opposing the World Court. 
As soon as the investigation began, all his employers and associates 
left him to his own resources. Mr. Shearer ].amented to Senator Allen: 
The minute you called this investigating comm.i ttee, all my connec-
tions, social and otherwise, closed. I found myself walking the streets 
talking to myself .33 
30Thid. J 682. 
31Ib.d 
--2:....· J 514ff. 
3~1d.' 540. 
33Ibid., 540. 
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He also testified about his activities with the American Legion: 
The former national cOlllillander of the American Legion--Commander 
Spafford, formerly of the United States navy, wrote a letter to ~ohn 
Thomas Taylor, who is the attorney representing the Legion here, saying: 
''You had better get Bill Shearer down there to post the new commander, 
McNutt, who is to make a speech at the Mayflower Hotel before the So-
journers." With that letter I came down to Washington, and I entered 
Commander McNutt's apartment and was with him until three in the morning, 
educating him, we will say, or posting him, or whatever you wiSh ••••• 
Therefore, I was pronounced by the national commander of the American 
Legion as the best-posted man in the United States on national defense. 
I have that letter ••••• The next night Commander McNutt made his famous 
speech. I had given him all the data that I thought was necessary to 
carry on the policy of the American Legion. When I returned to New York, 
I called up Mr. Willieomb, Mr. Hearst's private secretary, and said I 
had received a letter from Commander McNutt expressing himself not only 
for the navy, but opposed to the World Court, and if Mr. Hearst thought 
it was right, I believed that the patriotic organizations would take the 
same stand as the American Legion.:;4 
Mr. Shearer's complaint filed in his suit against the Bethlehem Ship-
building Corporation, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, and 
the American Brown Boveri Electric Company, stated his activities very pre-
cisely. To quote: 
Services rendered and performed by plaintiff relating and with res-
pect to the Shipbuilding industry, the business of Shipbuilding, and the 
increase thereof, as affecting the business and financial interests and 
welfare of the defendants; service as representative of the defendants 
at Washington, D. c., Geneva, Switzerland, New York City and other 
places in connection with the matters above referred to; the preparation 
and distribution of literature, data, and information relating to the 
above mentioned and other matters; interviews and conferences with vari-
ous individuals, including public officials and representatives of the 
press; the preparation and delivery of public addresses; the organization 
and conduct of a publicity campaign for the benefit of and aid of the 
business and financial interests of the defendants; consulting and ad-
vising with the defendants in relation to the above and other matters 
affecting their business and financial welfare; and generally aiding and 
assisti~ the defendants in the conduct and promotion of their business 
affairs. 5 
34 ~., 539· 
35Ibid., 662. 
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The testimony given at the investigation proved without a doubt that 
the three shipbuilding companies that were sued, at least, were guilty of t~ 
ing to obstruct the work at the Geneva Conference, and of influencing federal 
legislation concerned with cruiser and merchant-marine bills. Their propa-
ganda ~onsisted of the employment of "e~erts", publishing political articles 
in the newspapers and magazines, and giving lectures and addresses before 
patriotic societies, civic organizations, the American Legion, and chambers 
of eommerce.36 
In explaining how he got in touch with the shipbuilding concerns that 
later hired him, Mr. Shearer testified: 
I was approached by a man you have all heard of in his fight against 
the communists. He was then editor of the New York Commercial, a man by 
the name of Major Charles, of Military Intelligence, and, incidentally, 
the executive secretary of the American Defense Society, whom I know 
very well. They follow up the communist trend in this country ••••• He 
works very close to Military Intelligence. They incidentally gave me 
contacts with some people in Europe ••••• He introduced me to the subeditor 
•••• (who} was acting as vice-president of a club called the Propeller 
Club of New York, which carries on the marine dinners. Once a year they 
give a great dinner to the entire marine industry ••••• That is the way I 
became the speaker of the marine dinner at the Waldorf .37 
Possibly Mr. Shearer got the idea of tagging the odious name "commun-
ist" on to opponents of naval expansion from his friend Major Charles~ Any-
way, he used it. When he was in the employ of the shipbuilding corporations 
he wrote a masterpiece of propaganda with the title "Imperialistic for Peace" 
in which he definitely associated opposition to navy expansion with communism 
conspiracy, and revolution.38 
Of course, he could not mark with the red stigma, all advocates of 
36Ibid., 635. 
37Ibid. J 500. 
38 Ibid. sqq_6oo 
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peace, as Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Charles Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, 
and Henry L. Stimson; although he did go so far as to say that "our country 
was betrayed by Charles Evans Hughes" at the Washington Conference.39 He 
conceded that some were merely deluded or uninformed. 
An interesting bit of information brought to light in the investiga-
tion was that Mr. Shearer had never filed an income tax return even though 
he had received about fifty-thousand dollars from his employers in 1926 and 
1927. He treated it all as expenses, not income. "I was simply spending 
money to carry on a publicity campaign ••••• n40 
Robert S. Allen writing for The Nation magazine has given a vivid 
-. 
picture of the "fantastic tale". Of the executives who were called to testi-
fy he wrote: 
As if they had rehearsed it beforehand, these mighty figures of 
America's shipbuilding business, the builders of the nation's merchant 
marine and fighting craft, all on the witness stand strove to portray 
themselves, apparently~ to avoid a far blacker suspicion, in the roles 
of fools and victims.4l 
There was no record on the books of the company of Mr. Shearer's em-
ployment or of his salary. It had all been paid through their lawyer, Henry 
C. Hunter, who did it as a personal favor. Apparently, too, Mr. Shearer had 
been hired without any investigation as to his character or fitness. In 
testifying about this Mr. Bardo, then president of the New York Shipbuilding 
Company, which helped to finance Mr. Shearer's undertakings, said, "I think 
39Ibid.' 431. 
40Ibid.' ~5 f. 
~obert s. Allen, Mr. Shearer Likes a Big Navy", ~Nation, 129, 
October 9, 1929, 378-79· 
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my ordinary business judgment was disarmed by the familiarity Mr. Shearer 
showed with his subject. "42 
"I was jazzed off my feet on that proposition" confessed Mr. Wakeman, 
vice-president of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, in his explanation 
of why no inquiries had been made about Mr. Shearer.43 
1tr. Allen was rather sarcastic in his report of Mr. Schwab's "pious 
testimony". Charles M. Schwab was Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation and according to Mr. Allen he had 
joyfully announced his willingness to scrap his vast armor plate and 
shipbuilding plants to bring peace on earth, •••• and in the next breath, 
admitted that although it had been brought to his attention that Shearer 
had been employed for such work ("interference") by his company he had 
done nothing about it except to remark that it was nmost unwise".44 
In concluding his article Mr. Allen wrote: 
The connnittee saw fit to give the shipbuilders the "break" on the 
story ••••• The muddline and inconsequential examinations of the witnesses 
by the chairman, Senator Shortridge, and the casual questions of Senator 
Allen, certainly lent color to the widespread comment in Washington that 
they were not too anxious to carry on vigorously.45 
Mr. Shearer's Relations with Naval Officers 
The Senate Connnittee did not investigate what relations Mr. Shearer, 
as agent of shipbuilding concerns had with responsible officers of the United 
42 ~-. 378. Also Senate Document, 29f. 
43Ib"d J. • ' 378. .Also Senate Document, 149· 
44 Ibid., 378. .Also Senate Document, 93· 
45Ibid.' 379· 
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States Navy, but Mr. Shearer was quite frank in telling all. He declared that 
he had secured from the Navy Department a "more or less confidential" docu-
ment prepared by it, dealing with navy statistics;46 that he had made contact~ 
with "possibly ten or twelve admirals, and possibly a dozen or more captains, 
and every connnander and lieutenant connnander and lieutenant in the Navy De-
partmentn.47 He explained that he had got information from or at least 
talked "to every naval officer other than Admiral J"ones" while at Geneva48 
and that Douglas M. Robinson, Assistant Secretary of the Navy knew by whom he 
was employed.49 All this was not proven, but it is a fact, at least, that 
the chief of the Naval Intelligence Office, considered him important enough 
. 
to wire the American ambassador in Rome that Mr. Shearer would arrive at a 
certain time, and Ambassador Fletcher and the American attache received him 
and discussed the Mediterranean system with him.50 
There ¥res of cot~se, propaganda carried on not connected with Mr. 
Shearer, but the circumstances connected with his case were so flagrant, and 
the proof so conclusive that it has served well to illustrate how powerful 
naval propaganda was. 
46 Senate Document, 498. 
47 ~., 499· 
48Ib"d 
_...!.._•' 
49Ib"d 
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Movil§ Pictures~ Propaganda 
Merle Curti has called the movies a "blessing to the advocates of a 
big navy", and since such a large number of' our citizens are movie enthuai-
asts, this type of propaganda would be sure to reach many more people than 
any other sort. Besides the newsreels showing the sailors and marines in 
their immaculate and attractive uniforms, there were many feature pictures 
romanticizing war. The government gave considerable aid in allowing pictures 
to be made of West Point and Annapolis, etc. Ten percent of all the pictures 
produced between 1920 and 1928 were war pictures with startling titles as 
"Tell it to the Marines" and "Hell's Angels" .51 
The Montauk Point Case 
Representative Fred A. Britten, chairman of' the House Committee on 
Naval Affairs, was involved in this case of propaganda sponsored by the 
Transoceanic Corporation, which had been organized by Clinton Bardo and 
Lawrence Wilder, employers of' Shearer, and the Montauk Point Real Estate 
Company. Britten arranged that the Atlantic fleet sail into the waters of 
Montauk Point bay in the summer of 1931, rather than going to Newport. Why 
should the fleet sail into this bay? The of'f'icers and the men did not like 
it. There was nothing to do at Montauk Point tor it was really just an out-
of-the-way village about 160 miles from New York. Britten gave as his reason 
that he wanted to "revive the patriotism" in the youth of Long Island by a 
51 ' 
M. Curti,_Q£. Cit., 266-67. 
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view of our majestic fleet. It seemed that Frederick~. Libby, of the Na-
tiona! Council for the Prevention of War, had been making pacifist speeches 
on Long Island and Mr. Britten wanted to counteract this propaganda. 
There were many who did not believe that Mr. Britten was only prompte< 
by patriotism for it was discovered that he was a stockholder in the Montauk 
Point Development Corporation and also owned three and a half acres of land 
in Montauk. 
The Montauk Point Development Corporation and the Transoceanic Cor-
poration had great plans to use the bay as a port for ocean liners. By using 
this port the trip across the Atlantic could be shortened by twelve hours and 
these corporations planned to run a line of~ur-day vessels across the Atlan-
tic, if they could get a substantial loan from the public treasury. The 
United States Shipping Board refused to grant them aid and they were left in 
an embarrassing financial state. Something needed to be done and fortunately 
for them, Mr. Britten could do something spectacular about it, since he was 
chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs. 
H. K. Flaming discussed this situation in The Nation and he quoted 
1h-. Britten as saying that "Montauk Bay had unlimited possibilities". To 
prove to those people who thought the bay too shallow for a port of entry, 
the Congressman promised to have 
a practical demonstration enacted by the United States navy. As chairman 
of the Committee of Naval Affairs I will guarantee to the sceptical minds 
that they will see one of the United States fleets using the bay •••• and 
when they see the huge battleships anchored in the bay they will agree 
with my contentions.52 
52 H. K. Fleming, "Admirals See the Point", The Nation, 133, September 
2, 1931, 228-29. 
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When the fleet did sail into this bay the following summer Britten's 
promise was remembered. No wonder his patriotism was under fire in the news-
papers. It was preposterous to use the navy to popularize any money-making 
scheme or private citizens. 
~~League 
The Navy League is an association of citizens whose main purpose is 
to influence governmental policy. It was founded in 1902 to build up the 
navy, maintain its efficiency, and enlist popular support, all of whieh is 
perfectly legitimate. It insists that it is guided only by patriotism, and 
that it is working for a cause that is sacred to the overwhelming majority 
of American citizens--preparation for the protection of their heritage 
against foreign aggression; but, when it is discovered that the League is 
connected with those directly interested in the manufacture of war materials, 
its sincerity can be doubted.53 
The list of founders is not only impressive, it is enlightening. The 
Navy League journal listed eighteen men and one corporation as "founders". 
The corporation was the Midvale Steel Company, makers of armor plate, with 
the United States Government their valued customer. Among the individual 
founders were Charles M. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation; j. P. 
Morgan, of the United States Steel Corporation, controlling the Carnegie 
Steel Company; Colonel R. M. Thompson, of the International Nickel Company; 
B. F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy under President Harrison, who later be-
53 Charles A. Beard, "Big Navy Boys: Who is Behind the Navy League?" 
New Republic, February 3, 1932, 314-18. 
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came attorney for the Carnegie Company and the Harvey Steel Company; George 
Westinghouse, of' wide affiliations; Clement A. Griscom, director of' the 
United States Steel Corporation, the Cramp Ship and Engine Building Company; 
and S. S. Palmer, a director of' the Lackawanna Steel Company.54 
It is hard to believe that these men, who would directly profit trom 
large appropriations for the navy, were actuated only by patriotism. It wooid 
be easier to place faith in the League if' they were allied only with individ-
uals and interests who received no financial benefits from its work and propa 
ganda. 
In 1930, the Navy League was opposed to the London Treaty. To quote 
from a news report: 
A smashing attack on the London Naval Treaty was fired by the Navy 
League of' the United States yesterday on the eve of' the special session 
called by President Hoover to consider the Pact. Heretofore the League, 
reflecting the viewpoint of' the high co:mma.nd of' the American Navy, has 
withheld judgment on the treaty, merely urging that its consideration be 
postponed until next winter to allow the American people an opportunity 
to study it. The statement yesterday, however, issued by Walter Bruce 
Howe, chairman of' the board~ ripped into the treaty as jeopardizing 
American national security.J5 
Defeated in its efforts to prevent the ratification of' the Pact, the 
League then turned its attention to propaganda designed to induce the United 
States to build up to the limits set by the document. In relation to this it 
is interesting to note that the British Navy League were in accord with our 
Navy League. In a cable dispatch from London, October 20, 1930, we read in 
the New York Tribune: 
Strongly worded views concerning the present attempts to limit sea 
armaments are expressed in a statement sent to the newspapers of' London 
54 Navy League J"ournal, February 1904, 32. 
55washington Herald, J"uly 7, 1930 
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to-night by the (BritiSh) Navy League on the eve of Trafalgar Day ••••• 
'To Nelson", it says, "the pacifism that is faShionable to-day would have 
been as inconceivable as the pathetic trust in treaties unsupported by 
force ••••• It is the aim of the (BritiSh) Navy League, in days when the 
strength of the national navy has become a subject of political bargain-
ing, to strive to keep alive the spirit which ereated and held our vast 
empire--the spirit that Nelson embodied. War is always hateful, but an 
empire dependent on the sea and unprepared to defend6its vital arteries will sooner or later be diShonored and dismembered'!5 
From this it is learned that the British Navy League also proposes 
to demand a navy strong enough to perform a major operation in any waters of 
the world--and triumph over all possible foes. The logical interpretation 
from this would be that all nations build up their navies to overtop all 
others. But what an impossible situation! 
President Hoover did not trust the propaganda agencies during prepar~ 
tiona for the London Conference. According to the ~ ~ Evening ~' the 
government had warned American societies, such as the Daughters of the Ameri-
can Revolution, that 
their alleged connection with the anti-disarmament agencies will be ruth-
lessly investigated by the Department of Justice should they attempt to 
interfere with proceedings in London. All "big navy" propaganda agencies 
in the United States are said to have been similarly warned ••••• To the 
shipbuilding interests which employed Shearer it has been intimated that 
President Hoover has legal power to withhold further contracts from pri-
vate shipyards and that the President will not hesitate to exercise his 
power at the slightest sign of defeatist agitation. Finally, the United 
States navy itself has been reminded that the President is commander-in-
chief and that his decision regarding future policy must override the 
opinions of admirals.57 
Whether this report was accurate or not, for a time at least, war 
ship builders were extremely wary about exerting themselves against the dis-
armament movement at London. 
56New ~Tribune, October 21, 1930. 
57New ~Evening~. November 22, 1929. 
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~Hoover Naval League Battle 
Training its heavy guns on the White House, the Navy League drops 
three screaming shells at the President's feet: "Abysmal ignorance! n 
"Starving the Navy!" "Bigger and bloodier wars!" The President an-swers, 
~ntruth and distortion of' fact!" "Indirect campaign of' misinformation."~ 
Thus began an article in the Literary Digest entitled "Hits and Duds 
in the Hoover Navy League Fight". 
The trouble between the President and the Navy League began when 
President Hoover requested the navy to cut its budget in the autumn of' 1931. 
The Navy League issued a vitriolic attack upon the President's proposals and 
upon him personally, in a fourteen page statement issued by Mr. Gardiner. 
"The entire statement" declared the~ .!2!:! Herald Tribune corres-
~ondent, giving us the high lights of it, pointedly sought to picture Presi-
dent Hoover as giving way to European and Japanese demands to further his 
~opes f'or reduction in armaments. "It" unreservedly opposed the Administra-
~ion's naval policy from the earliest proposal to make food supplies immune 
~rom interference in time of' war to the latest decision to agree to a general 
pne-year construction holiday. "Such a holiday proposed by the League of' Na-
~ions, would weaken us further, relatively in auxiliary craft, making us 
~hird instead of' on a parity with England" declared Mr. Gardiner. 
Assailing the President's ef'f'orts "to restrict, to reduce, and to 
starve the United States Navy", Mr. Gardiner hit the high spot of' his 
attack when he turned to Mr. Hoover's proposal •••• to iimn.unize food sup-
plies from attack in war: 
It would be difficult to express too much regret that the most humani-
tarian of pacific intentions had led President Hoover into exhibiting the 
58"Hits and Duds in the Hoover Navy League Fight", Literary Digest. 
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abysmal ignorance ot why Navies are maintained and of how they are used 
to accompliSh their major md.ssion. For acceptance ot his suggestion would 
have worked not only diametrically counter to the interests and weights 
ot the United States in world affairs, but, in effect, would have made 
tor bigger and bloodier wars.59 
Mr. Gardiner accused President Hoover ot having reached secret agree-
ments with Ramsay MacDonald when Britain's Prime Minister visited the United 
States in 1929 and that the Administration intended to discontinue the con-
struction ot cruisers already begun. 
In short Mr. Gardiner charged President Hoover ot starving the navy 
and deliberately and knowingly betraying his country by placing its interests 
below those ot other nations.60 
These were serious accusations tor a patriotic organization to bring 
against the President ot the United States, and President Hoover felt bound 
to make an issue ot the indictment. He issued a formal notice that: 
In order that the country may know the untruth and distortion of tact 
in Chairman Gardiner's recent pronouncement, I will appoint a committee, 
including members of the Navy League, to whom agencies of the Government 
will demonstrate these untruths and distortion of tact. Such an in~uiry 
will absolve the members ot the League who have not participated in this 
statement. Upon its completion, I Shall expect Mr. Gardiner to make a 
public correction ot his misstatements and an apology therefor. 
It is desirable tor the public to know the character of this indirect 
campaign of misinformation to defeat the efforts of the high officials of 
the Navy Department and the Administration for the reduction of Federal 
expenditure •••• 6n order that we may avoid increased taxation of the peopl 
in these times. 1 
On November 6, 1931, the committee appointed by the President made a 
full report on specific points and came to the unanimous decision that the 
ss··--.. --
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statement of the Navy League's president "contains many inaccuracies, false 
assertions, and erroneous conclusions and that his assumption as to the Presi 
dent's attitude toward the navy is wholly unwarranted". 
The specific points the committee reported upon were as follows: 
1. The committee denied that President Hoover had entered any secret 
agreement with MacDonald prior to the London Treaty. 
2. {The committee denied} that the Administration had refused to let 
an executive committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations see 
the full accord of the negotiations and possibJa commitments preparatory 
to the London Naval Treaty. 
3· (The committee denied} that President Hoover in 1929 had held up 
construction of five cruisers pending the outcome of the London Confer-
ence. The committee said only three cruisers had been held up. 
4· (They denied) that President Hoover in accepting the League of 
Nation's proposal for a one year naval building truce had intended to 
surrender American rights to build up to treaty strength or to stop 
construction of any eight-inch gun cruisers or other vessel under con-
struction. 
5· (They denied) that the President's economy program would impair 
efficiency despi~~ the fact that it reduced personnel and warships in 
full commission. 
One result of the Navy League attack upon the President was a flood 
of criticism against the League. Honorable Burton L. French, chairman of 
the naval subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives, issued a statement in which he said: 
Having in mind the sound policy of the President and the reasonable 
naval construction that is going forward, the issue right now becomes 
larger than the Navy League and resolves itself into whether or not the 
country shall have regard for actual naval needs and for the burdens of 
taxation that rest upon the people, as the President insists, or ignoring 
national welfare, turn the federal Treasury over to the exploitation of 
62 
~ ~ Times, November 8, 1931. 
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those who have personal ends to serve--navy yards and shipbuilders, air-
crai't and munition manufacturers--and to some extent officers who are 
blinded by personal interests in seeking their own ends ••••• ~~en an or-
ganization that prates patriotism sinks to the level of issuing the type 
of propaganda that the Navy League has issged, faith in any legitimate 
reason for its existence is challenged •••• 3 · 
At the same time, the declaration by Mr. French was supplemented by 
a statement from Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas in which he said: 
We have understood all the time that the Navy Department is in ac-
cord with the President's program; the attack of the Navy League was not 
justified in any degree. 
It should be understood and remembered that the Navy League includes 
in its membership those who sell steel, others commercially interested 
in the armament building. These have a selfish interest to override 
their loyalty to their country and their own regard for the truth. The 
fact is, we have had this same kind of fight from the Navy League--false 
statements, misconstructions of government reports, half truths hooked 
up with barefaced falsehoods--every time we have tried to hold down ex-
penditures for the navy to a reasonable limit ••••• The pity of it is that 
in the past the Navy League has imposed on the public, especially along 
the seaboard, as a patriotic organization. The country should be grate-
fUl to President Hoover for having torn o:f'f 1 ts mask and shown it to us 
as the greedy commercial organization it is--seeking to make excessive 
profits from the government fQr steel and ship-building companies under 
the plea of super-patriotism.04 
The Navy League got support from Honorable Fred A. Britten, but 
since he was in disrepute because of the Montauk Point circumstances, it did 
the League little good.65 
Since republics are as likely to be destroyed by a corruption of 
morals within as by attacks from without, every person, private and official, 
who writes and speaks about naval expansion or reduction should be above 
63 ~York Times, November 9, 1931. 
6~ew ~Times, November 7, 1931. 
65New York Times, November 1, 1931. Mr. Britten said he would intro-
duce a bill prcnT:iding for the spending of $150,000,000 on naval craft. 
r 124 
suspicion as to interested motives. Armament and shipbuilding men should not 
make the decisions, nor should the naval officers do so. They have too much 
personal interest to be able to see the case in its entirety. It is a 
problem for the disinterested citizens. 
r 
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Conclusion 
In determining the naval policy of the United States, it is necessary 
to deCide what is to be defended. Should the people and land of this con-
tinent be preserved? Every one will agree that the answer to this question 
is yes, at all costs! Should the Western Hemisphere be protected? Undoubted 
ly, the people of the United States would support the government in its at-
tempt to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, which is the government's announcement 
that it will regard as unfriendly any endeavor on the part of any European 
power to annex additional territory in this hemisphere. 
Should Samoa and the Philippines be defended? The answer to this is 
given in the Four Power Treaty of the Washington Conference whereby American 
Possessions in the Far East are not to be fortified. To adequately defend 
these, it would be necessary to create an immense naval base at the Philippin 
Islands and then station enough ships of war in those waters to win a victory 
over Japanese plus British fleets. By our agreement concerning the ratio 
with Japan, Japan is to be secure against aggression in her home waters as 
the United States is in the American waters. 
Should .American connnerce be protected in all waters of the world? 
By accepting parity with Great Britain, the United States has renounced the 
right to build a navy that would be able to defeat the British navy in its 
own waters and our ratio pledge with Japan has made it impossible to do so 
in Japanese waters. Evidently then, American commerce was not to be de-
fended in all waters of the world in the sense that our navy was to be kept 
large enough to be able to be victorious against any or all powers outside 
l 
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American waters. 
These limitations are a part of our public policy and from these it 
can be assumed that fundamentally the naval policy of the United States is 
but twofold. First, the maintenance of a navy strong enough to defend conti-
nental United States, whiCh was summed up simply and clearly by President 
Hoover in a statement made on Navy Day, October 27, 1931, as follows: 
The first necessity of our government is the maintenance of a navy 
so efficient and strong that, in conjunction with our army, no enemy may 
ever invade our country. The commanding officers of our forces inform 
me that we are maintaining that strength and efficiency. 
Ours is a force of defense, not offense. To maintain forces less 
than that strength is to destroy national safety; to maintain greater 
forces is not only econaifc injury to our people but a threat ~ginst our 
neighbors and would be righteous cause for ill-will among them. 
The second point of our naval policy is the enforcement of our Monroe 
Doctrine. 
At the conclusion of the London Conference there is no doubt that 
relations between the United States and England were at a friendly stage, 
,~ particularly because of Prime Minister MacDonald. Our relations with J"apan, 
:~ also, were amicable. The !.!!! York Times believed that J"apan wanted to be 
"on good cooperative terms with the United States", and saw in J"apan's agree-
ment a "proof that a policy sagacious for J"apan and friendly toward the 
United States had been decided upon".67 
We had reached a point where we hoped that our navy was to be a 
shield not a sword, but as early as 1931 we could see the beginning of the 
end. In our own country the London Limitations Treaty was interpreted by 
the big navy men like Fred A. Britten, as an agreement for expansion programs 
66Jiew York Times, November 8, 1931. 
67NewYork Times. April 2, 1930. 
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Japan planned for repleniShment programs and a new naval race darkened the 
skies. 
The political settlement reached at the Washington Conference was en~ 
ed when Japan launched her military campaign against Manchuria in September 
1931, altering the status quo in the Far East. This was the first major blow 
at the new system of limitation and prevention built up by the weary nations 
which had suffered in the World War. The strength of the naval pact was spen1 
its repute gone and there was no principle on hand except peace by force. We 
live now under dreadful forebodings--all Europe in turmoil, the Far East in 
turbulence, our own four-billion dollar naval appropriations bill--where can 
it all end? We had hoped for so much, now we despair. Yet, the vital energy 
which has caused man to overcame barbarism in the past will still seek civil-
ized methods. The ten year period 1920 to 1930 has Shown a way. For a time 
only, ideals are at an end and we recall those words in which so sophisticated 
a statesman as Mr. Balfour described the overwhelming effect of the speech 
with which Mr. Charles Evans Hughes opened the Washington Conference: 
I listened to a speech which I thought eloquent, appropriate, in every 
way fitting to the work of the Conference which was about to open, or whid 
indeed had been opened by the President, without supposing that anything 
very dramatic lay behind. And suddenly I became aware, as I suppose all 
present became aware, that they were assisting not' merely at an eloquent 
and admirable speech, but at a great historical event. It was led up to 
with such art, the transition seemed so natural, that when the blow fell, 
when the speaker uttered the memorable words which have now gone round 
and found echo in every quarter of' the civilized world, it came as a 
shock of profound surprise; it excited the sort of' emotions we have when 
some wholly new event suddenly sprillgs into view and we felt that a new 
chapter in the history of world reconstruction had been worthily opened.6a 
That chapter opened so auspicoualy must wait to be continued. 
6S · Conference ..2.!!. ~Limitation _2! Armaments, Washington, 1921-1922, 96 
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For information on the United States Naval Policy, 1919-1931, there 
are three good source materials. First the documents, second, the newspapers 
and periodicals of the period, and third, the books written by contemporary 
writers, including the speeches of prominent men. 
Documents 
Indispensable to an understanding of the subject are the Congressiona 
Records published in Washington by the Government Printing Office. Beginning 
for the year 1920, use was made of the Congressional Record of the 66th Con-
gress, 3rd Session, Volume 60, and of. the Senate Document No. 428 of the same 
Congress and Session which was entitled~ Yearbook. The Yearbook gave a 
resume of the annual naval appropriations from 1883 to 1921 inclusive, includ 
ing statistics of foreign navies. A record of the work of the Washington 
Conference is found in Senate Document 126, Volume 10, ~Conference .2!! ~ 
Limitation .2!, Arma.ment, Washington, E_ • .£., November ];,g, 1921-February §_, 1922 
with the report of the American Delegates at the end of the volume. The re-
port of the American Delegates was printed as a separate volume, also, ~-
~ 125, Volume IX. 
For the developments of the naval policy 1922 to 1927, the Congress-
ional Record of the 68th Congress Volume 65 was helpful as well as Sundry 
Legislation Affecting ~ Naval EstabliShments 1927-1928 which was found in 
the Congressional Record of the 70th Congress. 
The ill-fated Geneva Conference is reported in a Senate Document 
1!2.· 2.2,, 70th Congress, 1st Session, designated as Conference .f.2E. Limitation 
of Naval Armament. Records.£!. Conference held~ Geneva~ _gQ-August lt,l9_gj 
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The United States Naval Proceedings Volume 55, 1929, 7lst Congress was used 
for information on the progress of the expansionists in the year 1929. The 
next effort of the opposing group was the London Conference and the official 
record of this can be found in the following: Proceedings _2!. ~ London 
Naval Conference, 1931 publication, the United States Congressional Record, 
Senate, 7lst Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 72, and for the Special Session, 
Volume 73, which gives the arguments against ratification. The Hearings 
before Senate Committee~ Foreign Relations, May 1930, was essential. The 
treaty itself is called Senate Document .!!2· Jdi!, 7lst Congress, 2nd Session. 
For the scandalous Shearer case, the facts are given in Alleged!.£-
tivities at~ Geneva Conference, Hearings before~ Subcommittee .2! ~ 
Senate Connnittee .2!! Naval Affairs, 12..22· 
There were still other government publications that were helpful, 
including the Annual Reports .2f.lli Secretaries _2!. ~ ~ and of the Treas-
ury, .!!• ..@_. Delegation .1£ !!'!2. Naval Conference, London 1930, and the London 
Naval Conference, Speeches~ Press Statements E_z Members.£! the .American 
Delegation januaryEQ-April 32, 1930, Conference series 3, Publication 67 of 
the State Department. Authentic figures about the navy are to be found in a 
Senate Committee Print Navies of ~ World, prepared for the Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs by the Chairman Frederick Hale, 1928. 
Newspapers 
Use was made of the following newspapers at the Newberry Library: 
the~ .!2!'ls Times, New~ Tribune, New York Herald Tribune, ~ .!2!:! !!£,-
~ ~' and the London Times. The files of the Public Library of Chicago 
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were referred to for the Chicago newspapers, while advantage was taken of the 
library at the University of Chicago for the Washipgton Herald and Washington 
~as well as the English newspaper Manchester Guardian. The~ League 
Journal was found at Crerar. In the exciting years, as far as the naval 
policy was concerned, 1921-22, 1927, 1929-30, there were almost daily notation 
and press comments to be found in the newspapers of the country. 
Periodicals 
The articles printed in the magazines of the period are innumerable. 
!Reference to the Reader's Guide will give valuable leads. The following are 
some worth reading: 
Hard, W., "God and Chess at the Washington Conference", il. ~. 21, 
Pctober, 1921, 827-32. 
Hard, W., "Give and Take at the Washington Conference", ~' 21, 
~ovember, 1921, 950-55· 
Gardiner, W. H. , "Naval views of the Conference", Atlantic, 129, 
~pril 1922, 521-39· 
Bywater, H. C., "Limitation of Naval Armaments", Atlantic, 129, Feb-
~ary, 1922, 259-69. 
Peffer, N., "East Meets West at Washington", Century, 103, November, 
11921, 49-63. 
Sullivan, M., ttNot Hymn Books but Bank Books", Colliers, 68, October 
29, 1921, 5-6. 
The Congressional Digest.,!! and!!!! were very very valuable aids giv-
~ng speeches by the authorities from several viewpoints. 
Smith, R., "Breakdown of the Coolidge Conference", Contemporary, 132, 
September, 1927, 290-95· 
Oulahan, R. V., "Personnel of the .Arms Conference", Current Histo:r:z, 
~ovember, 1921, 185-93· 
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Vanderbilt, C., "Great personalities at the Conference", Current His-
~, 15, January, 1922, 563-66. 
Schornsthetmer, G., "Renewal of Naval Competition", Current HistoE:, 
17, November, 1922, 239-48. 
Coolidge, C., ''Message on Naval Arm.am.ents with Text of Memorandmn.", 
Current History, 25, March, 1927, 912-15. 
Kawakami, K., "Hidden Conflict at the Three-Power Naval Conference", 
Current History, October, 1927, 108. 
Hart, A. B., "President Hoover's Challenge to Big Navy Propaganda. 
Shearer Case", Current Histo;r, 31, October, 1929, 156-58. 
Dennett, T. , "Why Bother About Japan" , Current Hi story, 43, February, 
1936, 467-72. 
Kerr, P., "Navies and Peace: A British View", Foreign Affairs, Octo-
ber, 1929, 20-40. 
Spender, H., "Riddle of the Cruisers", Fortnightly Review, September 
27, 1927, 317. 
Gehle, F., ~¥ill the Conference Aid Business?", Formn., 66, November, 
1921, 423-31. 
Beard, C. A., "Bigger and Better Armaments", Harpers Magazine, 158, 
January, 1929, 133-43· 
Beard, C. A., "Our Confusion Over National Defense. Shall We Listen 
to the Pacifists or Admirals", Harpers Magazine, 164, February, 1932, 257-67. 
~Literary Digest is of great service in supplying surveys of news-
paper opinions. It had articles for the years 1921, 1922, 1927, 1929, 1930 
that were found to be of value. 
There were also many articles in~ Nation. Some interesting ones 
are listed below: 
"Disgraceful Naval Bill", 112, June 15, 1921, 836. 
"Harding's Grave Responsibility", 113, July 6, 1921, 5· 
"Price of Peace", 113, September 21, 1921, 310-11. 
"Pact and After", 128, January 16, 1929, 61. 
~. Shearer Likes a Big Navy", 129, October 9, 1929, 378. 
"Billions to Reduce", 130, May 21, 1930, 589. 
"Not a Dollar", 132, February 25, 1931, 205. 
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"Admirals see the Point", 133, September 2, 1931, 228-29. 
"Leading Navies Compared'; Scientific American, 124, February 12, 1921, 
130-31. 
"BattleShip Strength of the Five Leading Naval Powers", Scientific 
American, 120, January 18, 1919, 52-53· 
"Post-treaty Standing of the World's Navies", Scientific .American, 
130, May, 1924, 320-31. 
In addition the following magazines were used and found valuable for 
the public opinion of the time: 
Commonweal 
Contemporary 
Fortnightly 
Liv~~ 
New Republic 
North .American 
Outlook 
Review of Reviews 
Saturday Evening Post 
World's Work 
Books Written!Z Contemporaries 
At the Washington Conference the diplomacy was the new American style-
open and newspaper reporters were welcome as well as others interested in the 
~ork of the delegates. Several books have been written by persons present 
daily and are listed as follows: 
Ichihashi, Yamato, ~ Washington Conference ~ After, Stanford 
~niversity Press, Stanford University, 1928. Mr. Ichihashi was secretary and 
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interpreter of the late Viscount Kato, Japan's senior delegate to the Washing 
ton Conference. When he wrote this book, he was professor of Japanese histo 
at Stanford University. This book follows the result of the Conference with 
its far reaching effects upon the diplomatic situation in the East, down 
through 1928. It is a scholarly and impartial view of the accomplishment of 
that and subsequent conferences. 
Tarbell, Ida M., Peacemakers--Blessed~ Otherwise, Macmillan Com-
pany, New York, 1922. This is a book of impressions set down each week of 
the first two months of the conference. It reflects the atmosphere of the 
conference and gives the public feeling toward it, from the cynicism of pre-
conference days giving way to the evident sincerity. The closing chapter is 
an attempt to measure the results of the conference. It is a vivid and in-
timate account. 
Sullivan, Mark, The Great Adventure at Washington, Page and Company, 
Garden City New York, 1922. Mr. Sullivan's account is optimistic and pic-
turesque. It has distinct appeal and charm for it is kindly and humanly 
written. He gives word pictures of the delegates. 
Buell, Raymond Leslie, ~Washington Conference, D. Appleton and Com 
pany, New York, 1922. Mr. Buell's work is more realistic than Sullivan's, 
but a very reliable source book. 
An analysis of the Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927 is 
made by P. J. Noel Baker in his Disarmament ~ ~ Coolidge Conference, 
The Hogarth Press, London, 1927. 
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Secondary References 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, American Secretaries of State and their 
- ----=;;;.. 
Diplomacy, Knopf, New York, 1929, Volumes 9 and 10. A valuable reference. 
' 
Blakeslee, George H., Recent Foreign Policy.£!~ United States, 
Abingdon Press, 1925. This gives a survey of American foreign policies duri~ 
the four years Mr. Hughes was Secretary of State. .An excellent running ac-
count. 
Buell, R. L., International Relations, Henry Holt and Company, NeW 
York, 1925. Mr. Buell has made a careful study of the subject and has writte1 
adequately upon it. 
Bywater, Hector, Navies~ Nations, Houghton Mifflin and Company, 
Boston, 1927. A valuable contribution is made by Mr. Bywater to the movement 
tor naval limitation as well as to the history of international relations. 
It is replete with technical data and political interpretation. His standing 
as an expert makes his facts unimpeachable and lends weight to his deductions 
It is free tram bias. He has also written a second authoritative book enti-
tled ~Power_!!! lli Pacific, London Constable and Company, 1934. 
Several books were consulted for information regarding the Church 
and Peace Organization which were: 
Cooke, R. ;r., ~ Church~ World Peace, Abingdon Press, New York,l92<, 
Gulick and MacFarland, 1!:! Church and International Relations, Mia-
sionary Educational Movement, 1917, and 
Curti, Merle, Peace .2! War--~ American Struggle, w. W. Norton and 
Company, New York, 19.36. This last mentioned book is a well balanced account 
1.36 
of the movements against war, in America from colonial times to the present. 
It is a sympathetic history of American pacifism. 
Fox, Sir F., ~ Mastery .2f. ~ Pacific: Can the Bri tiah Empire and 
the United States Agree? .Tohn Lane, The Bodley Head, London, 1928. Sir 
Frank Fox sets out to explain American Foreign Policy to the British and to 
the American people as well. He sees the United States succeeding or sup-
plant i:og Great Britain as bearer of the White Man' s Burden. His plea is for 
cooperation to preserve the status quo in the Pacific. 
Latimer, Hugh, Naval Disarmament~ Washington Conference !2, ~' 
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1930. A clear presentation 
of the problem. He has eight appendices giving important documents, etc. 
Kenworthy, .T. M ., and George Young, Freedom of ~ ~, Horace Live-
right, New York, 1928. This is an authoritative discussion of the vexed ques 
tion of freedom of the seas in the historical perspective of the controversy 
and from the points of view of both English and American, during and since 
the war. 
Millis, Walter, ~Future .2! Naval Power..!!!:.~ Pacific, New York, 
1935. The author analyzes Captain Alfred T. Mahon's theory of the role of 
sea power and discusses the alternatives that face the United States in deter-
ning its Pacific policy. 
Moore, Frederick, America's Naval Challenge, MacMillan Company, New 
1929. Mr. Moore gives a fluent and interesting narrative of the whole 
of historical events from the period before the entry of the United 
into the World War down to the adoption of the Pact of Paris. It is 
a clear, informing narrative. 
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Patterson, Ernest M., The World's Economic Dilemma, Whittlesey House, 
MoGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1930. Increasing economic interdependen 
of all countries not merely of a few--is the big fact that has emerged since 
1914 is Mr. Patterson's basic idea in this book. Professor Patterson surveys 
the economic situations in the leading countries of the day and the difficul-
ties that confront each. Valuable material. 
Shillock, J". C., Postwar Movements_!£ Reduce Naval Armaments, Carnegie 
Endowment for international Peace, 1928. This book has been v~itten to clari 
fy the situation by presenting the basic principles of naval reduction. It 
is a genuine contribution--well ordered information. 
Williams, Benjamin H., The United States~ Disarmament, Whittlesey 
House, MoGraw-Hill Book Company, New York and London, 1931. Mr. Williams 
gives the details of the various methods employed in previous conferences, 
and the ways in which the United States may cooperate. Its clarity and sim-
plicity are to be recommended. Good reference. 
Williams, Benjamin H., Economic Foreign Policy .2.f ~United States, 
Whittlesey House, MoGraw-Hill Book Company, New York and London, 1929. Mr. 
Williams states the issues clearly and soberly with a careful assessment of 
all the arguments. 
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